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INTRODUCTION: AN ETHICAL DEFENSE OF SELFHOOD AS OTHER-CENTRICITY  It is not a truism that altruism is less natural than selfishness, or has less normative authority—for an ordinary self. It is false, or so I shall argue. The self can be naturally unselfish, and by that, I mean at least two things: self-regarding desires are not primary in any sort of ethically relevant sense, and the self is in large part constituted by its commitments to others. Moreover, the self can act as and for another, a metaphysical point I will develop throughout the entirety of this essay, but especially in my final chapter.  As early as Plato’s Republic, the Greek and Euro-American traditions have grappled with the rationality of morality construed in terms of a potential conflict with prudence and rational self-interest. When Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates with the Ring of Gyges scenario, Socrates argues that it is better to be seemingly unjust (or, falsely perceived as exclusively pursuing egocentric considerations), but actually just, than to be seemingly just, but actually unjust. By the final chapters, Plato, through the mouthpiece of Socrates, argues that it is to our advantage to be moral. More specifically, he argues that it is to the individual’s advantage to maintain moral integrity. For even Thrasymachus—the moral rascal and antagonist of Book I—would admit that there is obviously some benefit to society operating within a moral framework. However, the clever egoist will readily take advantage of that very framework, and, when possible, act amorally (and perhaps even immorally) to further his own advantage. To the contrary, Plato argues that it is always advantageous for the individual to lead a just life (in the sense of adequately promoting the greater good). Still, Plato’s driving premise is construed in 
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self-regarding terms; the just person will enjoy the benefits of a healthy mental life, and the unjust person will not.    The problem is that a socially acceptable egocentric consideration sometimes comes into direct conflict with considerations for the greater good. For those of us who are unconvinced by Divine Command Theory, we do not want to be forced between sensible, reasonable action, and a moral command that runs against the grain of what it would otherwise make sense to do. More precisely, self-interest and 
prudence are eminently rational; it makes practical sense to advance one’s own interests and to seek the best life possible for oneself in terms of personal rewards and achievements.  
The first, and most obvious, question here is, “What sort of self-interest are we 
talking about?” I will limit the conversation to commonsense interests that operate within a legally and socially sanctioned framework. For example, say Mr. Price has been a law-abiding, and for the most part, good-natured citizen and neighbor. He has amassed considerable wealth in the health industry. He does not endorse a health mandate requiring healthy individuals to pay into a coffer that would cover the expenses of lower cost health insurance for the most vulnerable and poorer citizens. If Mr. Price has a legally sanctioned choice between keeping more of his salary or keeping less (by way of taxes), and he sees no personal reward in keeping less (it will not directly improve his life-standard), we would need to provide some good reason for him to keep less. Improving his own life-standard within a legally acceptable framework makes immediate sense. It makes so much sense that Mr. Price might argue that this mandate is an unjustified “penalty” for those who reap 
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no benefits from it. While those who disagree with Mr. Price might claim that moral 
incentives provide him with a good reason to pay into the coffer, they must either show him how moral incentives make rational sense, or convince him that morality in some instances overrides rationality (say, “rationality” understood as instrumental reason). But if they insisted on the latter claim, then they would be committed to the view that morality (specifically as it relates to altruistic and unselfish behavior) is either sometimes extra-rational or irrational. In other words, it represents either an entirely different order of practical motivations that (hopefully) encompasses calculative and instrumental reasoning, or somehow transcends it, or simply makes no material sense. We can safely rule out the last option here.   So, if we want morality to be reasonable, then we must assume that the following is true: altruistic and unselfish behavior are eminently rational; it makes sense not to always pursue what would secure the best life possible for oneself in terms of personal rewards and achievements.  Now, a parent might not want to sacrifice her time and personal goals to 
improve her child’s situation, but she often feels not only compelled to do so, but justified as well. However, like Mr. Price, she might not want to sacrifice a portion of income she could otherwise spend on her child (say, as an added boost that would allow her to send her child to an academy for gifted science students) to help secure 
services for her neighbor’s or a complete stranger’s child. The bone of contention lies in this seemingly innocuous statement. When exactly does the greater good override self-regarding and mildly hedonistic considerations? Perhaps there are 
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extra-practical reasons to endorse altruistic considerations and considerations for the greater good, but if we believe we can provide an answer to the question, “Why 
should I do that,” and if one serious answer is, “Because it is morally right to do so,” then morality is practical, in the broader sense that it has a right to be taken seriously, and sometimes followed at the sacrifice of one’s own good. Perhaps, then, we do not want to limit our sense of practicality to only instrumental reasons. If it is obvious that we have a moral reason to contribute to a coffer that prevents 24 million people from being uninsured, and if it is obvious that health care is a right and not a privilege, then we’d better have reasons to provide those who disagree, and fist-pounding moral declarations will not usually do the trick.   What sort of argument could one provide to Mr. Price? Mr. Price might offer his own moral argument: “Forcing me to give up some of my legally earned income to help others get along is a Robinhood scenario, and it is wrong to forcefully take from the rich simply because they are rich; allow me to decide when and to whom I provide charity.” We might counter with a utilitarian argument, to which he might counter with a rights-based argument: “I have a right to opt-out of maximizing 
total good when it directly harms me.” We’ve reached an impasse here.  Mr. Price insists that he is not a moral villain; if he could have it his way, the poorest and most vulnerable would be cared for, but not on the premise that he must be forced to participate through regulations and taxation. Why would he make such a claim? Perhaps, autonomy takes moral priority over equitable wealth distribution. In any case, he would be arguing that providing affordable services to the most vulnerable is a worthy goal. However, that does not mean that it should 
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be directly his problem, and that he should not have ultimate say in how and when he chooses to participate in that endeavor. The problem then becomes this. I. Prudential, egocentric considerations are eminently rational (within a framework of accepted legal and social sanctions). II. There are normatively-binding altruistic reasons and greater-good reasons that it sometimes makes sense to pursue. III. But there is no arbitrating principle that allows us to definitively settle a principled conflict between reasonable, egocentric considerations and altruistic and greater-good considerations.  I know that I would do better for myself not to contribute to the coffer, and I appreciate that doing otherwise would be good under some description, but there is no self-certified principle that says I should sacrifice my egocentric pursuit for the greater good in this case. Moreover, no one doubts the obvious fact that self-care is both justified and consists of a dynamic set of personal concerns that we must balance in nearly all situations. To better reflect this, I need to add the following claims.  IV. Unless we have knowledge of an arbitrating principle, it would make more sense for us to pursue what benefits us personally (when in doubt, and all things being equal, self-care is the obvious choice.).  V. We do not have knowledge of such a principle.  VI. Conclusion: when in a conflict of principles, self-care is the obvious choice, which leads to the damning conclusion that: 
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VII. The altruist and do-gooder acts irrationally when confronting a conflict of principles between self-interest and altruistic and greater-good considerations.   We want to reject (VII). Why? Say a man hurls himself in front of a car to protect a stranger from being hit. This seems to be a clear case of potential conflict, and we want to say that his heroic deed is morally good. However, based on the points above, this forces us to accept the conclusion that the act is both morally good and irrational (or extra-rational). This implies that, to this extent, morality is irrational. But even if we reject (VII), we still do not know how or when we are justified in acting on those considerations when they conflict with egocentric considerations. This might motivate endorsing some form of ethical egoism (the view that we are morally sanctioned to always pursue an egocentric principle). However, aside from it being a flawed theory, it does not make immediate sense of our intuition that altruism and greater-good considerations are not always irrational (and certainly not morally bad). It rejects the moral worth of sincere altruism altogether. Another option is rational egoism (the view that other-regarding considerations are justified by improving our own situation in the long run). This is more promising, because we can certainly show how greater-good considerations can benefit us in the long run, but we would need some complicated principles to show how it accommodates altruism. However, an attenuated form of rational egoism might work. This would take the form of a so-
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called harmonizing strategy.1 If we can show that advancing our own practical interests can advance a maximally better state of the world, then both self and other are served. We would still need to show how altruism fits into this picture. But harmony seems to be the best bet.      Some of the thinkers I will assess pursue versions of this strategy. For example, Samuel Scheffler2 argues that it is partly constitutive of value-driven creatures like us to include relationships and the good of others in the scope of our goals. My account of the so-called normative self (particularly in chapter 4) similarly argues that how we constitute our values, projects, and our own practical identity includes a primary acknowledgement and appreciation for the independent value of others; the self remains an underdeveloped notion without an appreciation for how it constitutes its own worth by coordinating with others, and by taking their needs seriously. Psychological egoism—the view that we are always and only driven by self-interest—is simply unconvincing when we consider how much our own self-interest is bound up with the good of our neighbors, our social peers, and our nearest and dearest. The ruthless or brazen egoist is simply an aberration, and more of a philosophical bogeyman than a standard (though he can materialize as a real President of an apparently real country!). Hobbes was wrong (see Leviathan, Part                                                       1 Caspar Hare, On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), 2. Hare describes this as the “peacemaker’s” strategy. Harmony consists of a situation in which: whenever a mild egocentric hedonist favors a situation in which she suffers less, she thereby favors a simply better maximal state of affairs.   2 Samuel Scheffler, “Potential Congruence,” Morality and Self-Interest, ed. Paul Bloomfield (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2008). Also see, Samuel Scheffler, 
“Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in 
Moral and Political Theory (New York: Oxford, 2010): 41-76. 
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VII.1), and, bracketing the cogency of his argument, Plato’s conclusion was mostly right.   On the other hand, the South Asian philosophical traditions provide an 
important distinction that considerably nuances the problem. For the early Pāli Buddhist texts, the ego-self—the historical, culturally situated, and practical self—is 
bound to cycles of suffering, because it “craves” existence, and attaches itself to the fruits of the world, while desperately trying to avert what it finds to be unpleasant. This is one sense in which the ego-self is always a “duḥkha-self” (a suffering-self). This pan-Buddhist belief is encountered in some key Mahāyāna texts as well. In fact, barring the intricacies of Indian and Indo-Tibetan Tantrism, we could say that this is simply a pan-Indian, religio-philosophical belief. In some sense, psychological egoism is a basic state of the constructed ego (ahaṅkāra). However, I think this goes too far. Oftentimes, our deep appreciation for the needs and well-being of others is also an attachment that keeps us tethered to cycles of suffering. It’s not that we are all psychological egoists. Instead, we are desperately attached to the agonies and ecstasies that come out of our actions, which, in turn, constitute us and our loved ones in this world. For those South Asian philosophers that endorse the belief in an underlying self, the key to freedom and well-being lies in seeing through the veil of the ego. The metaphysical self is more than just substance or Aristotelian 
hypokeimenon (subject), but also an experiential ground that transcends the narrow needs and values of the ego (ahaṅkāra). On the other hand, for Buddhists, who reject the authority of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the key to freedom lies in experiencing and understanding the illusion of the self without attaching to some 
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reified entity like the metaphysical self (ātman). How a thinker makes sense of the 
“essencelessness” or “emptiness” of self (nihsvabhāvatā or śūnyatā), will, among other epistemological and ontological considerations, determine what sort of Buddhist philosophy she endorses. In chapter 2, I cover, from a logical point of view, a variety of No-Self views to help situate how one might reject belief in a real self.3   However, and to the point at hand, the distinction between an ego-reifier (ahaṅkāra), and, either metaphysical selflessness or a transcendent subject, impact how we think about self-interest. One South Asian thinker, Śāntideva (c. 8th Century C.E.) seems to argue that seeing through the illusory persistence of the ego defuses obsession with narrowly prudential reasons, thereby providing rational grounds for 
altruism. However, as a Mādhyamika Buddhist (whose view is either deflationary or                                                       3 Consider this a prolegomenon of sorts to an inter-cultural assessment of selfhood. I note this, because the No-Self, or, “without-Self” claim (anātman), and its practical and rhetorical uses, can take on decidedly distinct implications throughout the 
many “Buddhisms” that span the texts of the Pāli-Theravāda tradition, to first millennium Sanskrit texts, to the Indo-Tibetan and Chan and Zen texts. Much of what I have here is a rational reconstruction grounded more firmly in the robustly metaphysical debates of Indian-Sanskrit texts from roughly 6th century to 11th century CE. Dr. Peter Hershock, in a personal conversation, has pointed out that the 
early adoption of “without-self” for the Pāli tradition appears to have been more of a practical concept with minimal metaphysical commitment—especially because the Buddha was known to avoid deep metaphysical claims—and that an early adopter of Buddhist practice was enjoined to see the self as no-self; that is, to recognize that the self is not fixed or bound to Brahmanical caste (varṇa). Hershock suggests that given the large number of working class and agricultural (vaiśya) adopters of Buddhism, an existential crisis may have loomed for these early devotees, and 
anātman may have been a device for re-orienting the interpretive possibilities of selfhood, a call to author a self from outside the constraints of caste and Brahmanical society. While I do not have the space to explore this intriguing point through textual and historical analysis, one would do well in revisiting 
Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, a canonical Theravāda compendium that construes No-self in practical terms, and does seem to eschew a deeply metaphysical gloss of the concept. Much of how I treat what I call the Normative Self in chapter 4 is 
consistent with Hershock’s point that the “No-self” of Pāli texts is a practical self who must learn to author itself through its commitments and intentions.  
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radically dismissive of any metaphysical assumptions), Śāntideva does not endorse the view that there is a transcendent self that supports universalizable and impartial 
principles of justice and morality. Śāntideva believes that metaphysical selflessness is tantamount to an admission that, all things considered, prioritizing our future (non)-selves is really a matter of pragmatism and degree. Any reasons guiding us to focus on our (non)-futures are reasons we can extend to all other present and future (non)-selves. Like Derek Parfit after him, Śāntideva believes that recognizing metaphysical selflessness, to some extent, deflates the rationale for obsession with narrow self-interest. There is simply no persisting self in which to place too much stock. On the other hand, Śāntideva offers a controversial positive claim: it is precisely metaphysical selflessness that justifies impartial care and universalizable reasons. When we can view all suffering as suffering as such—something unowned and generalized—we can respond to it impartially and without concern for the ego’s self-interest. In short, we can become altruists.   In chapter 2 (and more broadly in chapter 1), I examine this claim. I argue that metaphysical selflessness is consistent with acts of omission and negligence, and thereby consistent with some forms of practical selfishness. However, in chapter 3, I develop my own version of what I’m calling, Emptiness Ethics, which is 
inspired by Śāntideva's account. I ultimately argue that this account is deficient, primarily because I believe that a more robust notion of self explains how altruism is even possible. When we limit the conversation to the interests of the ego-self, we ignore the fact that selves are emotionally porous (to be explained in the body of this work), and they are porous as selves, not as bundles of psychophysical property 
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tropes. The metaphysical-ontological reasons that may support belief in the reality of a substantive, metaphysical self goes beyond the scope of the present work. However, as ethicists who believe that impartial standards describe an important part of what we mean by morality, we must to some extent invest in a view of reality that is not completely immersed in situation, historical context, and narrative self-identity. Still, thinkers like Michael Sandel,4 to name a few, resist such a view, and this is precisely why they take liberal thinkers like John Rawls5 to task. Whether Rawls has invested in a metaphysical self, or, instead, has operated from an “as-if” political model that makes better sense of the phenomenon of justice as fairness (as I understand him to argue in Political Liberalism), he envisions the possibility of a self both recognizing itself as self, and yet viewing itself as possibly anyone (hence, 
Rawls’s “veil of ignorance”). Christine M. Korsgaard6 attempts to navigate the divide between a radically situated, practical identity, and universalizable principles that emerge from an impartial view of the self as sharing in a kingdom of rational, universal ends. For Korsgaard, at the periphery of more local practical identities, we each have the capacity to identify with the role of humanity (and this is an exclusively practical rather than metaphysical consideration). As I point out in chapter 1, she believes that the metaphysics of self and personal identity do not 
                                                      4 In addition to Sandel’s numerous articles critiquing contemporary liberalism, a classic text that lays out his communitarian thesis is: Michael Sandel, Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 6 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian 
Response to Parfit,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 2 (1989): 101-132. Also see, Christine M. Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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directly bear on practical, ethical questions. I also explain in chapter 1 why I disagree, which brings me to the outline of my argument.  The problem centers on the conflict in authority between self-interest and altruistic and greater-good considerations. My view is that thinking in terms of a strictly personal set of ego-interests versus consideration for strictly distinct others produces the problem; however, we do not need to limit our view of self to such a distinction, and this is the key to solving the problem. Interests are not ultimately a narrow band of outcomes that apply solely to an ego-self. But, as we’ve seen, not seeking the best possible, first-order outcomes for oneself does not always mean that one gives up self-interest and prudence; rather, it can also mean that at a higher-order of analysis, one can also include the good of others as part of what constitutes one’s self-interest in terms of personal rewards and achievements. I am going to show how that is possible.  However, my solution should not be conflated with a similar, but importantly distinct solution. The distinct solution I refer to might look something like this: I can 
include the good of others as part of my personal value set. By “personal value set” I mean that in serving these others, I am, by extension, serving my radically situated self. Others come into the picture, but the rationale for caring about them is that I advance my higher-order interests. This is bound up with my narrative identity, my history, and my personal projects and goals. This does not mean that I do not care about others; on the contrary, I learn to identify closely with their good, and their good becomes part of my personal good. This is an oblique form of rational egoism, 
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because if I cannot personally identify with their good, I have no reason to promote it. I believe my solution is not a disguised form of rational egoism.   
HOW I CAN BE AN ALTRUIST IN A NORMATIVE SENSE I can include the feelings, motivations, and concerns of others as intrinsically valuable to the self as such; not the ordinary, ego-self, but the self that identifies with selfhood and subjectivity as such. When I do so, I advance 
the good of a “we-self” and not just a “me-self.” This is less an experience of 
personal reward, and more an experience of acting “because it must be 
done.”   To make sense of this, I must provide a view of subjectivity that distinguishes between an ego-self (ahaṅkāra) and an experience of subjectivity as such. Thus, a few preliminary points are in order. First, I believe our capacity to envision selfhood as such is bound up with intersubjectivity. Contrary to Korsgaard (as I read her), this is not a purely practical matter. In fortunate moments, we can radically share our emotional lives with one another, and this is not just a matter of inference, nor is it because the ascription of mental properties is strictly functional talk for physical behavior (either in the subjunctive, as the logical behaviorist might have it, or solely in the use of language, as one might read latter Wittgenstein). Rather, and secondly, I believe we can be open to sharing subjective worlds, because self-awareness is basic to consciousness, which is not to exclude the abundant unconscious thoughts and feelings we harbor; to the contrary, the kind of self-awareness I’m talking about is mostly an implicit sense of presence, and such background awareness is by its very nature not represented as being delimited by context, situation, or body. I am not 
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making the ontological claim that background self-awareness is in fact free of 
limitations, or unencumbered by a body. Rather, I’m pointing out how background self-awareness remains attuned to a broader expanse of possibilities that are not directly tethered to narrative identity and ego-hood; it relates to self as such, and 
not only to self as “this body” or “this history.” Unencumbered by such representations, it remains open to the experience of subjectivity in general, and thus open to the expression and experience of other subjectivities. I also do not believe that we experience things like suffering and joy as radically ownerless (or something purely emergent from a selfless bundle of psychophysical property tropes). In some sense, when shared and co-owned, suffering can show up as simply 
suffering (and in this sense, there is a quality of ownerlessness), but that is only in contrast with the mundane view of the radically private ego-self, who can only 
indirectly experience another’s feelings.  This underlying sense of self supports our capacity to share our world with others, and, at times, recognize that the individual ego supervenes over this larger 
sense of “we-ness.” This is not so distinct from Buddhists like Śāntideva speaking (I suppose, metaphorically?) of a collective, interdependent field of selfhood. However, the point is not that we lose all traces of self, but rather, that the self does not always delimit its sense of presence (and responsibility) to a single, embodied, and historically situated entity. The self can identify with selfhood writ large, and when it encounters other agents who suffer or act toward their valued ends, it can identify with those purposive actions. 
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 Whatever reason there is for a self to avoid needless suffering; whatever reason there is to respect the dignity that comes with autonomy, and the power that comes with agency and purposive action; such reasons apply to selfhood as such; to the sense of delighting in pure presence. In this state of identification, we do not 
recognize these reasons as being “only my” reasons; we can simply recognize them as motivating forces, which are sometimes represented as explicit principles, that extend to all those who share in selfhood. And this must mean that we recognize—not infer—other selves who share in that general presence. We can sometimes act purely for the sake of another as both other and as one’s self. The principle that might arbitrate between strictly egocentric considerations and altruistic and greater-good considerations emerges from an experience of suffering as such, which, given the peculiar nature of suffering, simply demands action. That experience shows up as “we who suffer, and must alleviate suffering.”   My argument is based on an analysis of selfhood within a normative and a metaphysical framework. First, I argue that the everyday self is constituted by a sense of relationality and social-embeddedness, which is articulated through the capacity and urge to communicate and be understood. I expect you to honor my wish not to suffer at the hands of cruelty, and I successfully communicate and understand that need to the extent that I recognize the applicability of that wish to you. It is therefore only natural that I recognize a reason to honor that wish, irrespective of its advantage to my personal projects and immediate desires. The normative framework this presupposes requires a self that recognizes reasons that transcend self-regarding desires (and, perhaps, desires altogether). If this is true, 
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then the concept of a robust divide between self and other—the sort of divide that sets the egoism and altruism debate into motion—emerges out of an initial experience of primordial relationality and porousness. The concept of self develops in tandem with the concept of other, and ties many of the reasons one has for caring about oneself to reasons applicable to caring about another. There are goods that guide and motivate the action of a self that can only be understood as shared goods, things like the value of avoiding needless suffering and cruelty, of caring and being cared for, of enjoying respect and companionship, and having the space to pursue projects free of arbitrary constraints. Such motivating reasons appear only to the extent that they apply universally. Anytime one recognizes such reasons, and thereby promotes the good of another—irrespective of personal desires—one acts in a mundanely altruistic way, that is, one acts without immediate concern for one’s own advantage. I say “mundanely,” because it is possible to help a stranger simply because the stranger needs help, and this can be as simple as listening to and allowing a person who needs companionship to engage you when it is taxing and inconvenient. In other words, the other’s needs may become the sole target and motivator of action.   Still, the talk of “reasons” remains somewhat empty without assessing the nature of motivations; what theoretical ethics has referred to as the Problem of Motivation. A theory of self also impacts how we make sense of empathic identification and the experience of responsiveness to the demands others make upon us. I believe that emotions like compassion, for example, serve important epistemological functions. I come to know something about you and your needs 
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through the contagion of how you feel and how that makes me feel. I come to know your frustrations and the urgency of your needs (not only my private response to your emotive behavior), because the self is also emotionally porous. The manifest fact that we commit ourselves to various actions by way of a guiding good, enacts a self that is mostly unthinkable outside of embodied normative constraints and sharable, emotively-charged and motivating states. An entirely selfish self—or one emboldened by the belief that its primary concern is with its own needs—does not only challenge our ethical intuitions, but also fails to recognize the very elements that constitute selfhood. Consequently, it fails to recognize the very elements that support and constitute self-interest.    To help explain this shared emotional and normative framework, I likewise contend that the self is sometimes recognized as expressing a real and larger whole. I will directly address the term of art, “recognition” (pratyabhijñā) in my assessment of the Kashmiri Monist-Śaivite philosophical tradition of c. 9th-11th century C.E. India. For now, I basically mean that in clear and honest moments the other who suffers does so as part of myself (or simply, as self), which is just to say that an experiential space of co-owned suffering (something that transcends the limitations of my immediate history and constellation of personal concerns) discloses itself and calls for a response that I can only learn to ignore. Just as I can learn to ignore my 
own suffering, I can learn to ignore the other’s suffering. However, the ordinary self  rarely remains completely blind to the presence of another’s suffering; we can only learn to ignore what shows up to be dismissed, and I want to say that it shows up as 
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inherently motivational. So, let us not confuse ignorance with blindness, or the irresponsive and irresponsible person with the blind, moral monster.   I am also proposing that our ethical experience shapes the metaphysics that help organize our experiences, in the sense that the ethical attractiveness of a framework provides a reason to endorse it. We construct the world through an ethically salient and shared lens. When suffering occurs, in some sense, the whole suffers (to be developed in my final chapter), which may provide me with the shared motivation to thwart such suffering. Through shared feelings, we can sometimes experience reality without solipsistically fixed partitions, or, an entirely singular point of view. Ethical responsiveness and ethical responsibility—in the form of a gripping call to action—disclose and shape the space of our experiences.   This is not Mill’s argument for utility. I do not assume that because each person values their own happiness, that each necessarily values the happiness of all. I find myself most pressingly concerned with a particular person’s suffering, and not just an abstract principle or an abstract whole. On one level of description, I must bridge a metaphysical gap between my immediate first-person experience and a suffering that indirectly shows up as another’s. And from this level of description, philosophy must contend with the epistemological and ontological problem of other minds. How is it that I come to know what you need, and know what motivates you or how to help you? How exactly do I come to recognize your needs as independently valid? But on another level of description, the gap was never there to begin with, which is just to say that the composite is not a fiction or conceptual imputation, but rather a background presupposition that allows me to share a world 
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with you. The part and the whole are real. I call this Mereological Holism, and I will describe this in detail in my final chapter. The upshot of this metaphysics is that it is possible to act from something far deeper than a principle or duty or rational constraint. This does justice to the manifest fact that we are motivated and affectively charged to shape our concerns into something like a principle, and that our concerns are often highlighted to a far richer degree in the face of our loved ones and our neighbors, with whom we more closely share a world. In this way, metaphysics finds its worth in its service to our basic ethical intuitions.   So, this is an essay about the nature of the self and the metaphysics of shared disclosure at the service of our ethical experience. The possibility I wish to explore is one that not only critiques what may seem attractive in ethical and rational egoism; I wish to examine the possibility of altruism being grounded in how we naturally constitute and share ourselves. The juggling act consists of developing a model of selfhood that supports the possibility of being rationally compelled to act solely for another’s sake, while making sense of how we can know the other, and directly share an emotional life that grips us in the form of a motivating obligation.   The first possibility is grounded in what I call the Normative Self, which is 
constituted by embodied participation in the authoring of one’s selfhood through commitments and avowals and disavowals. These commitments run more broadly than normatively rich social roles, or, what Korsgaard calls, “practical identity.”7  These commitments presuppose a complex and dynamic process of deliberation and tacit appropriation, which forges a dynamic but unified and integrated self through                                                       7 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity. 
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speech-acts that partly constitute the introspective experience of having a point of 
view. I develop this point more fully in my final chapter. I contend that the normative self provides us with desire-independent reasons8 to take others seriously, but it falls short of explaining how we directly experience and are motivated by the affective life of another. In short, the normative self provides reasons and obligations, while what I’m calling the Metaphysical View provides the emotive channel that compels us to action. I do not believe these are ultimately separate domains—the cognitive versus the conative—but, instead, argue that the normative framework co-emerges with the metaphysical framework.     This last point speaks to the second feature of the juggling act; what I have referred to as the metaphysical view. This self is not empirically observed, nor is it entirely personal. Instead, it refers to a unity that supports an otherwise fragmented and dislocated flow of psychophysical events. The unity and integrating synthesis lies in something much broader than a historically located constellation of personal experiences. This is an experience of direct connectedness, which at the level of everyday empirical and embodied historicity looks like an ownerless event. This may be reflected in the experience of losing a part of one’s self when another perishes, or experiencing the collective guilt that comes with a terrible collective deed, or the pride that comes with collective integrity.    
                                                      8 John R. Searle, Rationality in Action (Hong Kong: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001). 
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 The task here is to bridge the metaphysical gap between self and other, a gap that European ethicists like Henry Sidgwick9 viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to deciding which sorts of reasons—self-regarding or other-regarding—hold ultimate authority. For Sidgwick, both sorts of reasons hold equal authority, and therefore ethics will always reach an impasse when it comes to principled conflicts between egocentric versus altruistic and greater-good reasons.    In chapter 1, I lay out the landscape of this problem, and I develop a broad overview of a strategy developed in 1st millennium, Indian Buddhism. I am referring to various iterations of No-Self and Bundle-theory views of selfhood; basically, error-theories about the self. The idea is that, first, showing how the self does not exist can surmount the gap that fuels the problem, and, second, personal identity is not what matters most when it comes to examining the reasons we have for doing things. The usual critique of this strategy is that metaphysical non-commitments (and metaphysical views in general) do not deliver robust ethical upshots. The practical domain is as sharply divided from the ontological-metaphysical domain as the self is from the other. In chapter 1, I argue against this view to motivate the relevance of the No-Self and Bundle-theory options. I do so by arguing that speech-acts—even theoretical assertions and beliefs—commit us to various sorts of actions, particularly the adoption of further beliefs. In this sense, normativity is built into our discourse, and theoretical assertions importantly contribute to shaping and 
                                                      9 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981, republication of 7th edition, 1907). 
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guiding action.10 I also argue that the No-Self option—at least at its broadest level—does not necessarily motivate unselfish and altruistic action; but this is not because 
it attempts to derive an “ought” from an “is.” Instead, I argue that non-egocentricity—that is, a self that no longer recognizes selfhood in the world—may provide just as much reason to selfishly neglect required actions as it does to sacrifice one’s own advantage for the sake of another. In short, we need a more developed notion of selfhood to make sense of altruistic action.  In chapter 2, I situate varieties of the No-Self theory. I then examine a unique No-Self option provided by the Mādhyamika-Mahāyāna thinker, Śāntideva. 
Śāntideva is a target for study, because his work arguably comes the closest in the Buddhist philosophical corpus to a worked-out, systematic ethical system. But more 
importantly, Śāntideva coins an argument from ownerlessness that I wish to appropriate in my final argument in chapter 4. I also engage some of the abundant 
literature assessing Śāntideva's ownerlessness argument. I conclude that only more robust metaphysical assumptions (in addition to a key normative claim) may allow the No-Self and Ownerlessness views to entail an ethics of altruism. The problem for 
Śāntideva is that he endorses the Madhyamaka (“middling”) view of Buddhism, which eschews metaphysics altogether (or at least presents a deflationary view that can hardly help itself to robust metaphysical claims). However, the value of his work for my purposes lies in its emphasis on the ownerlessness of suffering. For 
Śāntideva, suffering is inherently bad and ultimately ownerless. So, if there is any reason under any circumstances to thwart suffering, then it applies to all equally. I                                                       10 Or, as Searle argues, all discourse is fundamentally practical. See Rationality in 
Action, especially chapter 2.  
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examine this line of argument thoroughly in chapter 2. The key fault I find with it (and develop in chapter 4) is that ownerlessness does not have strong ethical upshots without the support of a more developed notion of self. This sounds paradoxical, but my argument is that we can share motivations and feelings with 
others, and in this sense, they are “ownerless.” We could equally claim that motivating feelings are co-owned when they are shared. However, I stress them being ownerless, because these exalted experiences exist at a level of generality in which we are motivated by suffering as such (for reasons I have already provided). By recognizing integrated unity—both at the level of individual, sentient life-streams, and at the level of the whole—recognition of “ownerlessness” in terms of 
shared fields of consciousness provide motivating and emotively-charged reasons for action. My argument falls under a harmonizing strategy, with the caveat that both the individual and the whole are real. When we recognize this, we recognize ourselves acting as and for another: we achieve identity amidst difference.   In chapter 3, I attempt to provide a more worked-out and palatable version of Emptiness Ethics. I do so by appropriating the post-modern concept of “the 
Other” that we find in Levinas.11 Basically, I try my best to develop a No-Self ethics by drawing from a deflationary-minimalist reading of Madhyamaka Buddhism in tandem with a general reading of Levinas. I examine the argument that self-regarding considerations are only attenuated forms of other-regarding considerations, which collapses the metaphysical distinction altogether. I try to show how in the practical domain, this amounts to a kind of harmony between self-                                                      11 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, transl. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1969).  
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regarding and other-regarding considerations, a harmony that would justify and motivate altruism. However, in chapter 4, I point out where I think this version of the view goes wrong.   Altruism operates in more mundane ways, and it plays a foundational role in ethical maturity. Moreover, emotional states, like compassion, are bound up with the reasons we have for doing things. Without the sort of empathy that moves me to take up your cause as my own, I would not be attuned to the experience of ethical 
responsibility. It’s not enough to say that when I’m egoistic and selfish I am primarily or only bound to myself, as though that were the experience of principled responsibility for myself. Such blind egoism is mostly not experienced as responsibility, but rather as impulse and natural inclination; it’s purely motivational without a developed sense of the experiential modality of justification, which always requires a public world and an experience of otherness. The selfish person may know better, but nevertheless make morally bad and self-serving choices. But I believe that consistent and pathological selfishness betrays a muddled view of what is generally operative as a background presupposition for consciousness, namely, an integrating sense of general selfhood. Thus, recognizing justified motivations for altruism is a kind of gnosis. Extreme and pathological selfishness is both the amoral inability to experience ethical phenomena, and a distracted or delusional state (moha) that covers over what is operative in the reflexivity of consciousness.  
 xxviii 
 In chapter 4, I’ll develop an aspectual metaphysics that views the universe as multivalent,12 which means its individuals are, under one aspect, distinct and singular, but under another aspect, simply an expression of the whole; and this means that we can describe the universe in distinct but equally true ways. As one aspect, the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is other, and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole is that very act of aggression. This sort of metaphysics supports a phenomenology in which an individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences their needs as overwhelmingly motivational. According to this metaphysical model, the experience of overcoming egoistic considerations may reach an exalted pitch. Out of the experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity. The outcome amounts to what I call, Exalted Altruism. This refers to a state in which our deliberations take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may be viewed as supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality.  
                                                      12 The classic paper in aspectual metaphysics is Donald Baxter, “Identity in the 
Loose and Popular Sense,” Mind 97 (1988): 575-582. See also, D. Baxter, “Many-One 
Identity,” Philosophical Papers 17 (1988): 193-216. For a recent publication that provides thorough analysis and clarification of what is at stake in such a metaphysic, 
see Jason Turner, “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity” in Composition as 
Identity, eds. D. Baxter and A.J. Cotnoir (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014): 225-243. Turner captures the key thesis of Baxter’s position as follows: “Baxterian CAI [composition as identity] …holds that each part is identical to an aspect of the whole—which aspect is identical to the whole itself” (225-26). Thus, existence 
would be “count-relative” (226). This amounts to the claim that Leibniz’s Law under certain counts can fail. So, Kevin-as-a-father may spend too much time traveling away from home, but Kevin-as-an-itinerate philosopher may not spend enough time away from home (on work related trips), or might spend an adequate and expected amount away from home. In some sense, then, a thing can be different from itself under aspects (not properties) which, taken as properties, would be contradictory.  
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 To bolster this view, I assess the problem of other minds, and critique the view that we come to know the other through indirect inference rather than shared psychophysical states. As this problem was richly developed in the work of the 
Buddhist logician, Dharmakīrti (c. 6th century C.E.), who provided a unique account of the inference strategy, I will assess and critique his argument through the lens of 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































exists	for	the	Ownership	view.	It	could	be	that	whatever	will	provide	us	with	an	adequate	theory	of	action	is	more	sophisticated	than	either	the	Reductionist	or	Ownership	view.	In	order	to	defend	his	thesis,	Martin	tentatively	grants	that	some	further	fact	establishes	the	sameness	of	the	self	across	time,	and	that	this	self	will	reap	the	future	outcomes	of	its	actions.	Martin	argues	that	the	persistence	of	a	self	does	not	necessarily	justify	egocentric,	future-directed	concern	by	me-now	for	me-later.		 		 Here’s	one	reason	this	might	be	true.	Suppose	one’s	psychology	does	not	persist.	Let	the	felt	narrative	of	being-someone	be	diachronically	interrupted	and	disjoint.	Future	stages	of	a	self	whose	psychology	is	radically	distinct	from	the	present	are	too	foreign,	too	remote,	and	too	psychologically	disconnected	from	the	present	to	provide	the	self	with	reasons	to	have	special	concern	for	her	future	stages.	We	don’t	need	sci-fi	thought-experiments	regarding	teleportation,	or	fission	and	fusion,	to	make	this	point.	We	can	instead	project	into	a	future	in	which	one’s	views,	dispositions,	life-style	choices,	and	memories	and	self-interpretations	are	radically	different	from	one’s	current	ego.			 Martin	asks	us	to	grant,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	the	existence	of	a	persisting	self.	Imagine	that	the	self	persists	as	some	further	fact	behind	all	the	quantitative,	qualitative,	and	psychological	changes	that	make	up	a	conscious	human	life.	These	changes	can	be	more	or	less	continuous,	allowing	for	radical	ruptures	between	current	values	and	personal	history,	and	later	values	and	memories.	In	fact,	we	can	imagine	a	case	in	which	psychological	facts	about	a	particular	self,	say,	its	aims,	its	values,	its	existential	projects,	and	all	of	the	personal	memories	that	shape	its	
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CHAPTER 4. EXALTED ALTRUISM AND MEREOLOGICAL HOLISM 
4.1 Introduction  In what follows, I provide two broad accounts of selfhood: two general models that account for our sense of ownership and immersion in a first-person experience. Addressing the problem of how altruism is justified, I argue that both accounts provide us with reasons to pursue and perform altruistic deeds. One account provides ontologically minimal scaffolding, while the other provides an ontologically thicker account of how altruistic reasons can be robustly motivational in nature. The first account advances “the normative self,” a general model under which a variety of normative accounts of selfhood may fall. The second account 
advances what I’ll simply call, “the metaphysical view.”  The normative self owns its mental and physical states because of individuating a narrative history, which is strung upon an embodied, normative-emotional framework through avowals and disavowals. Such individuation has been 
referred to in the literature as “participation,” or, the forging of a “participant self.”1 The normative view offers an ontologically minimalist account of our capacity to 
recognize rational reasons for taking up another’s cause at our own expense. However, in section 4.2, I will argue that the normative account does not adequately                                                       1 Ganeri, The Self, 32 (see fn. 41). Ganeri borrows this from Laura Waddell Ekstrom 
“Keynote Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Review Vol. 59, 1999: 1057-63, also: Ekstrom, “Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self,” Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, 2005: 45-67. As quoted from Ekstrom by Ganeri, a 
participant self is “a self constituted by ‘a collection of preferences and 
acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that [collection],’ where a preference is a desire formed by a process of critical 
evaluation, and acceptance marks the ‘endorsement of a proposition formed by 
critical reflection with the aim of assenting to what is true’ (2005: 55).”   
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explain our capacity to connect directly with others in an experience of emotional wholeness, an experience that I believe is essential for both motivating altruistic deeds and for making sense of the epistemology of intersubjective, motivationally- emotive states. Of course, I owe an explanation of what I mean by “wholeness,” and I 
will develop that account through what I’m calling, “mereological holism.”  To this point, the metaphysical view offers an ontologically deeper account of an underlying sense of identification with others, which justifies concern for the well-being of others to the extent that concern for any suffering is justified. The idea here is that if I feel compelled to care and be motivated by my own suffering, it can make sense for me to care and be motivated by another’s suffering so long as that suffering can in some non-trivial sense be shared. While a similar conclusion is reached in the normative account, the metaphysical account supports its view based on aspectual metaphysics, or, mereological holism (to be explained in what is to come). To develop this point further, I will draw on the metaphysics of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy (the “Recognition School”) of the c. 10th century Kashmiri philosopher, Abhinavagupta. Without necessarily endorsing his theological commitments, I believe that his metaphysics are instructive for the contemporary view that reality is multivalent, and thus describable in both pluralistic and monistic terms, with each description providing an equally true count of objects that can be viewed as both a collection of individuals, as well as aspects of a single, but composite whole. So, for example, we can count the car in terms of many parts, and we can say that only the hood is dented. But we can also count the car as a single whole, and simply say that the car has been damaged, and the latter description is 
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not simply reducible to the former. This, I believe, provides a way of making sense of intersubjectivity—and shared motivations—while preserving the integrity of difference and pluralism.   For Abhinavagupta, realization of an underlying universal Self paradoxically both actualizes and overcomes (perhaps in the Hegelian sense of aufhebung!) the real presence of otherness, particularly, the otherness of other selves. He argues further that when we recognize our wholeness as a universal Self encompassing all individuals, we do not gain new information (that is, he does not offer this as an empirical claim), but rather, we clarify for ourselves what was already there to begin with—something akin to (but not identical with) unpacking an analytically derived claim from a concept clarified with greater depth. This is not to be confused with a Fregean sense/reference distinction, where the whole and the individual have distinct senses, but identical reference. According to Abhinavagupta, and his predecessor, Utpaladeva, clarifying for ourselves the nature of selfhood—understood as a self-reflexive unity of consciousness—discloses a background unity; we can re-cognize an original unity that lingers as an obscured, but background presupposition. We do not immediately recognize this original unity, because, according to Abhinavagupta, we are ontically “distracted/deluded” (moha) by the play of individuation and particularity, which Abhinavagupta describes as the universal self playfully “forgetting” itself (like an actor or child fully absorbed in a role).2 For Pratyabhijñā philosophers, the self allows itself to get absorbed in its role                                                       2 See Utpaladeva’s Vivṛti, verse I, 1, 5 (commentary on his auto-commentary to the 
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā: the seminal work that deemed this school, Pratyabhijñā philosophy), quoted by Abhinavagupta in his commentary, cited from Isabelle Ratié, 
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as limited and individuated beings. I will argue that even if we are uncomfortable speaking of a universal Self, mereological holism provides tools for making sense of metaphysical pluralism (individuals emerging as aspects, and not properties of the whole) while also acknowledging the real existence of composite, whole entities. The relationship between me and you, self and other, then becomes something like 
bhedābheda, or, “identity-in-distinction.” In other words, I will develop a metaphysics of identity-in-difference that, in tandem with Abhinavagupta’s metaphysics, might provide a fresh view on what it means to share an emotional world and be motivated by the needs and feelings of others.   At first glance, Abhinavagupta’s Advaita-Śaivite metaphysics (monistic metaphysics of the Śiva devotees) seems not only out of place in a discussion of the contemporary moral psychological issue of how to motivate other-regarding actions, but also paradoxical if not outright contradictory. It attempts to acknowledge the real existence of different individuals, while also transcending that individuation toward a single, universal Self. It is surely not a form of solipsism, and yet, it concretely gravitates towards a selfing of the other. If we are uncomfortable with the theological overtones of this view, we can, instead, think of the universe in terms of a real whole, or better, a dynamic system undergoing transition-states. 
                                                                                                                                                              
“Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy (2007) 35: 313-370, at 367 fn. 106. Abhinava quotes: “But otherness has as its essence nothing but an incomplete opinion of oneself (abhimāna) that is produced by distraction (moha) due to the self-concealing power (māyā) [of the Universal Self].” All 
references to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta will be draw from Ratié’s translation and her source manuscripts.  
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Individuals articulate “aspects” of the whole rather than distinct properties.3 In the 
view I’ll develop, the universe is multivalent.4 With respect to individual selves, we can claim that as an aspect, individuated psychophysical streams are distinct and singular, but as another aspect, they are never insulated from one another in their 
“interests” or “emotions,” and each of them remains simply an expression of a composite whole. This means that we can describe individuals in distinct but equally true ways (which is what I mean by “mereological holism”). As one aspect, the person I witness on the news leaving pipe-bombs in New York City is “other,” and the whole does not bear his sins. Under another aspect, the whole suffers and 
therefore is that very predicament of aggression. I believe that something like this can be articulated out of Abhinavagupta’s view. I draw from his metaphysics to show how the metaphysical view contributes to a phenomenology in which an individual identifies with the suffering of others, and experiences the other’s need as overwhelmingly motivational. I believe that the normative view does very little to make sense of this emotively-charged experience. The minimalism of the normative view might justify altruistic considerations, in the sense of abstract principles, but it does not adequately explain how we sometimes transcend egoistic considerations, and how we sometimes forfeit our own advantage for the sake of another’s welfare. According to my metaphysically thicker model, the experience of transcending egoistic considerations may reach an exalted crescendo when psychological 
altruism affords the moral agent a glimpse of the truth that “I can act for the sake of                                                       3 Donald L.M. Baxter, “Altruism, Grief, and Identity,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (March 2005), 371-383. 4 I borrow this directly from Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity.  
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all because I am all.” This, in turn, speaks to a capacity to experience an extraordinary cognitive and conative richness, something akin to the spirit of the jovial gift-giver, who is unhampered by an underlying sense of scarcity and anxiety. This sort of experience defuses the natural inclination to prioritize self-regarding concerns. Out of the experience of exalted fullness, we can overwrite egocentricity. The outcome amounts to what I call, “exalted altruism.” This refers to a state in which our deliberations can take on an exceedingly other-centric tone, one that may be viewed as supererogatory from the everyday state of transactional reality. In this 
sense, the exalted altruist experiences “selflessness” of the everyday ego by deeply identifying with something that transcends her own personal needs and her own embodied history.   In making this point, I am also appropriating aspects of Śāntideva's Ownerless view without endorsing the full-fledged No-Self view. At the level of shared feelings, we can sometimes say that the feeling does not belong to a single unit; there is simply grief and suffering that requires attention. On the surface, this may seem to challenge what I’ve been endorsing throughout the entirety of this essay, namely, the Ownership view. In section 4.3, I will briefly explain how this tension arises, and how I wish to defuse it. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I will articulate my final argument in broad strokes, and then proceed to defend it in the final segments of the chapter. Finally, in section 4.6, I will introduce the solution that the c. 7th century Buddhist idealist, Dharmakīrti offers with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity, or, other minds. I will do so to further develop my metaphysical view, which I build out of Abhinavagupta’s critique of Dharmakīrti and the account 
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of mereological holism that I provide in 4.7. While the metaphysics are, for me, mostly exploratory, I believe they are attractive from an ethical standpoint, insofar as they provide a motivationally compelling account of how we come to grieve and experience joy with others, and, consequently, how we sometimes share each 
other’s feelings, which includes the motivation to act on behalf of something that transcends our individual, narrative identities. My view supports the common sentiment that when someone grieves, suffers, or passes away, we can sometimes feel that a part of us has grieved, suffered, or passed away. I believe this metaphysics provides an attractive way of filling a motivational gap left open by the strictly normative account. In 4.8, I will conclude by connecting mereological holism to 
Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, and I will argue that this is an ethically attractive account of how we can directly share our world, and thus be motivated by something much larger than egocentrically present concerns.  
4.2 The Normative Self 
 In chapters 1 and 2, I argued that viewing the self as the unifying owner of embodied mental states provides an ethically (and naturalistically) attractive view. The view allows us to speak of “ownership” without positing a metaphysical entity, and without endorsing substance dualism. Ownership can refer to the practical fact that we exercise the capacity to endorse our mental states.5 While we can construe this in terms of higher-order deliberation, and avowals or disavowals, over first-order mental states, we can also view endorsement under the concept of authority.6                                                       5 See Ganeri, The Self, 323.  6 See Ganeri, The Self, 324, where Ganeri borrows from Bortolotti and Broome, “A 
Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion,” in 
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We exercise a capacity to accept and/or acknowledge that a mental state is our own, and in cases of thought-insertion, this is made abundantly clear.7 When we exercise this capacity, we come to more directly author our own lives.8  But this authority is not necessarily the free-wheeling libertarian authority that a Cartesian entity exercises; for one of the first insights new meditators experience is the capacity to witness the compulsive and scattered unfolding of the contents of their mind as an uncontrollable parade of feelings, emotions, plans, and fantasies. Not only do we seem to experience perceptual passivity in simply coming face to face and body to body with objects in the world, but we also experience introspective passivity in bearing thoughts we might quite consciously wish away to no avail. For example, I’m having an important meeting with someone I deeply respect, and I sense faint sexual feelings emerging throughout the conversation. More importantly, though, I sense that they are, in fact, my thoughts—I’m not going to childishly shoulder the responsibility on someone else. While I am assailed by such feelings, I also see them as belonging to me. I may paradoxically feel like I am the owner and author, but also the passive victim of such thoughts. But a deeper sense of authority emerges from the fact that, when things are going right, I can ultimately disavow such thoughts. This makes sense of me claiming, “Those are not                                                                                                                                                               
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2008): 205-224, at 211. Ganeri cites 
Bortolotti and Broome’s concept of ownership in terms of a physical base, spatiality, introspective access, self-ascription, agency, and authority. 7 Ibid, 324.  8 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays 
(Cambridge University Press, Massachusetts), 170: “To this extent the person, in making a decision by which he identifies with a desire, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire that he 
“has” merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a person may 
“have” an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body.”  
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the kind of thoughts befitting to this situation.”9 The important point here is that I can exert authority over, and in this sense, author a thought by determining the weight it has in the constellation of my deliberations and actions. For example, in spite of my initial aggravation and desire, I consciously elect not to shout at or threaten the infuriating driver who has blocked me in my parking spot. All of this is obviously cloaked in normative terms. For example, what’s befitting of me is that I sufficiently see my lover as a partner in desire and sexual joy; but what’s befitting in our board-meeting is that I see her as my colleague and superior (say, when she is the director or chair). In this way, we respond to normative constraints in determining which mental states we come to own through our avowals and disavowals, and this capacity is bound up with our prior commitments.   Ownership as endorsement is also bound up with embodiment, because normative demands both emerge from commitments presupposed in speech-acts—declarations, promises, and assertions—and from emotively-charged attitudes that are realized in our bodies.10 The self, then, becomes a normatively constrained, but dynamic framework of attitudes, emotions, and beliefs. This shapes what it makes rational sense to do with our bodies and our embodied thoughts. The self is also co-realized with other selves in a public space, which is shaped by commitment-laden speech-acts and the normatively rich social roles that we adopt. This is the sense in                                                       9 Ganeri, The Self, 323, also cf. fn. 6. Through the lens of the Nyāya philosopher 
Vātsyāyana, Ganeri writes: “We are all too easily persuaded that motivations, desires, and ideas are ours when in reality they have nothing to do with us, a 
mistake of taking to be myself what is not myself.”   10 Ganeri, The Self, 325-326: Emotionally-charged endorsements and motivationally relevant shifts in attitude imply embodiment, because beliefs and attitudes would not have force without us actually inhabiting rather than merely observing emotional perturbations. 
 165 
which a self is immersed in a first-person stance, and “takes a stand” on its identity in the various spheres of its social world. Borrowing from Laura Waddell Ekstrom, 
Ganeri calls this a “participant self,” who occupies and authors a first-person, embodied stance.11    This concept of selfhood is grounded in a physical, embodied structure, and to this extent, it makes sense to examine the neuronal correlates of consciousness (NCC). But the self also enjoys introspection and a sense of first-person “mineness” within that framework of participation and ownership. The participant self is a dynamic and complex entity that is unified in what it participates in owning of itself. This allows the self considerable flexibility in coming to identify with others through shared commitments in a “co-arising” and dynamic social order.   Now, one might ask, “What gives anyone ultimate authority over my natural 
right to do as I please?” He may further clarify, “By ‘natural,’ I mean my material capacity to reject any external authority (despite the consequences that may follow).” A crude Contractarian, in the classical Hobbesian sense, develops a picture of independent, rational agents coming together out of self-interest in some sort of original and explicit agreement.                                                        11 Ibid, 327: “Ownership…is now understood in terms of participation and endorsement, and so as implying the occupation of the a first-person stance and not merely the witnessing of a set of attitudes and emotions within oneself; and 
individuation (the question of ‘base’) is understood in terms of a common ownership relation obtaining between clusters of commitments, resolutions, and intentions, circumscribed by normative emotional response and implying agency 
and sentience and so embodiment.” This has been adapted from Ekstrom, “Keynote 
Preferences and Autonomy,” Philosophical and Phenomenological Review, 1999, 59: 1057-63. Ekstrom argues that the self is a “collection of preferences and 
acceptances…along with the capacity or faculty for forming and reforming that 
[collection].” 
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 However, the participant, or, normative self co-emerges in a social space.  Explicit agreements are not deliberated over with respect to background constraints. Instead, we have something like a dance of mostly unconscious and coordinated receptivity and interaction. For example, my capacity to determine the conditions that satisfy the use of a word in a particular context presupposes conventions that arise with and are sustained by other language-users. If I were to work as a projectionist in a retro, art-house movie theater, I could comfortably tell 
my assistant, “The film is running,” without provoking him to go on a wild goose-hunt for a film that he believes “ran off.” You, reading this passage right now, also understand that I am not referring to an assistant chasing after a plump, wild goose. This coordinated activity of sharing language and responding to appropriate meanings in given contexts is mostly reached without explicit agreements. Add the premise that my capacity to introspectively and publicly develop a sense of my individual identity is shaped by embodied and linguistically-constituted thoughts. This allows me to derive the conclusion that my sense of self is quite literally dependent upon others. In fact, as I pointed out in Scheffler (chapter 1), large portions of the action-guiding values that constitute our “self-interest” include the well-being and success of others in our life. We’re often unable to determine where 
our own success and another’s success part ways. The profit-sharing employee and 
the CEO can intelligibly claim, “Blue Steel Co. is flourishing,” while including their individual and collective success in the equation. We see this on a more intimate level in tight-knit families. The child’s success is partly constitutive of the parents’ 
success. And even if a parent does not acknowledge “success by association,” the 
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public might not view things as such. One might say, “Wow, you must be proud of 
her!” And while the “must” here is basically predictive, it can still retain some of its 
normative tone: “Whether you think so, you have something to be proud of; so enough with the misplaced humility: be proud!” From what I have argued, we can say that the socially immersed, normative self is required to take the needs of others seriously—in some instances, at its own expense—because the context demands it (in the same way that contexts provide implicit imperatives to use particular words with particular shades of meaning). The demand is not something mysterious. The demand may emerge in the very instant that I claim, “I am suffering, and you ought 
to lend me a hand!” If I consistently apply this imperative across appropriate contexts, then I recognize that it makes sense for you to make the same demand of me.12 Therefore, I have a reason to help you, even if I do not always desire to do so. This means that I can quite rationally act on that sense of obligation without having to prove that it serves me in some material way. In short, I can rationally be an altruist.   Now, this model is consistent with a Bundle-view of self, if that view leaves room for the notion of an embodied agent who has a say in ordering clusters of preferences, etc. that constitute her practical identity. However, the Mādhyamika claim that ownership and individuation are ultimately “empty” (śūnyatā) and erroneous concepts sharply distinguishes it from the normative view. From the normative perspective, there is a “resting place” (āśraya) for the self (see chapter 2); in other words, there is a real, albeit ontologically minimal, subject. The base of                                                       12 See John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Press, 2005), chapter 5.  
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individuation for a self emerges from a body capable of emotively-charged attitudes that are attuned to a normative framework. Whether a permanent, metaphysical entity underlies that framework may thus seem immaterial.   As I’ve pointed out, viewing selfhood in terms of ownership and participation adds another dimension to the stock arguments against ethical egoism. So long as our capacity to enjoy an independent life is premised on our ability and desire to align our intentions and actions with others, which is evident in the intention to communicate through the normative framework of language, we cannot believe that we are inherently privileged or subject to standards that transcend a general framework applicable to other selves. More importantly, the general framework we emerge from and implicitly commit to through communication does not always direct us to act in our own best interest. Assuming so betrays a depleted sense of what it means to be an inherently social self.  
4.3 Selves as “Ownerless” Owners: Revisiting Sidgwick’s Ethical Dilemma   In the previous chapters, particularly chapter 1, I addressed Sidgwick’s now classic thesis that egoistic and altruistic considerations represent fundamentally independent domains of concerns. In ethics, particularly applied ethics, we might struggle to justify which domain of concern has authority. For example, is it reasonable for me to sacrifice a percentage of my income, which could be spent supporting, say, my research and those things that bring joy and meaning to my life and my family, to support school-lunch vouchers for poor children in my state? Should I sacrifice my valuable office hours doing fulfilling and lucrative work to 
assist a student who has poor study habits and thus “needs my help” (after all, I’m 
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not in the business of teaching my adult college students how to organize their time and discipline their urges to procrastinate)? Of course, compassion, good-will, and various normative constraints (say, as a professor who must shoulder certain expected social responsibilities) provide me with reasons to contribute in a way that does not always directly benefit me in my personal life. And compassionately helping a student uncover his own incompetency and develop his talent is certainly one aspect of being an exemplary teacher (and not just a researcher). But the question is whether these reasons have some sort of authority over reasons of prudence and desire. For Sidgwick, the problem remained intractable, because ultimately our numerical distinction from one another gives us reasons that are sometimes mutually inconsistent, but enjoy equal authority. From the perspective of the individual, I am prudent, and concerned with long-term pleasure and fulfillment. From the perspective of the whole, I am concerned with the flourishing of the whole to which I contribute. But when I am numerically distinct from you, I retain the individual perspective. It seems utterly reasonable to promote what would serve me best. For example, it’s not so cruel to spend my Sunday watching football rather than answering my phone and consoling my chronically depressed friend, who always tends to reach out to me on my cherished day of relaxation. On the other hand, I am connected to a larger society and social network, and that requires that I promote the overall good. How do we judge which reasons hold greater authority?   A radical move is to deny what fuels this interminable stand-off; we might elect to deny the ultimate existence of numerical distinction. The Buddhists, particularly Śāntideva, present arguments that defuse the relevance of such a 
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distinction. For Śāntideva, the Owernlessness thesis—understood in terms of the 
Mādhyamika No-Self view—seems to entail that altruistic reasons have greater authority. I explained in chapters 2 and 3 why I think his argument ultimately fails. I can sum this up by saying that the No-Self view goes too far, because it destabilizes the authority of any reasons whatsoever. However, I believe that Śāntideva was on the right track in trying to disarm egoism at its core, namely, at the belief in ultimately individuated and owned constellations of psychophysical events that pit 
“my fair share” of goods against “your fair share.” This may seem contradictory to 
everything that I’ve tried to establish so far in this essay, because I have argued that we need some sense of ownership to make sense of our conventional and ethically salient reality. I’ve also claimed that the ultimate normativity of collective living (and language-use) provides us with a background of obligations and concerns that circumvent the problem of totally disparate domains of considerations remaining interminably at odds.   But in this final chapter, I want to further clarify and nuance what the Ownership view can mean. Conventionally, we need this view to make sense of our transactional reality—this much, any Buddhist would grant. However, the Buddhist might be right that achieving a sense of ownerlessness can motivate a transformative ethics. But I think construing this in terms of either “no self” or 
“without self” is not so conceptually fruitful. “The self” can also be viewed more substantially as an underlying synthesizer of otherwise disparate experiences. The 
self, as I’ve argued, allows us to make sense of communication, language comprehension, and arguably, memory in a way that epicycles of No-Self (or even 
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Without-Self) views do not. More importantly, it allows us to more easily make sense of our ethical transactions reaching their intended targets, and it supports our sense that compassionate concern for another is not defused over a possibly unbounded flow of ephemeral and radically individual person-events. From one level of description—say, a very narrow reading of Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernables—when John is concerned for Sarah at 20 and Sarah at 35, he’s concerned with different people (given the distinctness of properties between A and 
B). But the depth of concern he may have for Sarah at 35 may incorporate her real past. Sarah contracts lymphoma at 35, and John views this as an even starker turn of events given that she recovered from a nearly fatal aneurism at 20, which led to a bicycle accident that crippled her for several years. If the Lockean determines 
Sarah’s personal identity by memory alone, then John’s sadness in the face of Sarah’s long-endured pain would be misplaced if Sarah radically dissociates from or completely forgets her past. But John experiences sympathy for Sarah, and the 
meaning and quality of that sympathy encompasses the stretch of Sarah’s life. He may be glad that she does not remember some of these tragedies, but his sympathy is for the whole person, and not just for her memories, or for distinct and ephemeral individuals over which he has imputed an illusive unity. Sarah is the self-same individual who, in Hegelian terms, is whole over a dynamic mediation of becoming: she is not any particular piece of changing content, and yet she is “substance” in the sense of maintaining her unity (self-sameness) amidst determinate difference.   Now, one may argue that Sarah’s life has integrity as a narrative, so the current state of “Sarah-ness” is pregnant with the outcomes and memories of past 
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events (related in the right way). One may further argue that “no self” doesn’t necessarily mean that she lacks unity and wholeness in her life. There may be a 
sense of synchronic unity that integrates the moments of her life (even when diachronic unity has been eroded), but it is not metaphysically deep. She has a sense of wholeness, but it is nevertheless “without self,” which means that there is no further underlying fact about what integrates her into a whole and rounded individual. In response, I believe there is an advantage to viewing the self as that very wholeness, that is, in viewing Sarah as a real continuant. The general advantage 
is that “wholeness” is a unifying term (in a way that I believe “without self” is not), and it can accommodate diversity and relational dynamics, both in terms of individual lives, and in terms of group dynamics, without abandoning either the thread that connects an individual to the moments of her life, or connects an individual to the social spectrum of differences that conditions her individual contribution to that whole. While we may want to eschew the view that individuals are radically autonomous and static rational agents, and in this sense, claim that we 
are “without self,” the notion of wholeness allows us to imagine a synthesis of differences that begets shared values (when thinking in terms of diverse groups), and it allows us to view the individual as a dynamic but integrated being capable of real change as opposed to being only a conceptually constructed vehicle that organizes for us what is really just a replacement of experiences and property-tropes across independent events. Moreover, an advantage lies in being able to accommodate radical asymmetry between Sarah’s “internal” narrative and our 
“external” narrative of her life; there is a real set of facts about what happened to 
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Sarah despite differences of opinion and memory. On a practical level, this will impact how we treat Sarah, and it will help us better determine the sorts of remunerations we believe she may deserve. In the case of radical dissociation (or a breakdown in diachronic unity), this may even justify paternalistic measures to treat Sarah, and help her recover what she has lost.   Now, with respect to the nature of personal identity, we may reach a conceptual impasse, and perhaps our only recourse lies in more or less grounded decisions (rather than arguments). Either we help her “recover” her past by collectively imputing a metaphysically empty narrative that we can train her to accept, or she can recover memories and associations with different events that have occurred over the historical unfolding of her real life. I believe the latter has the distinct advantage of requiring less counter-intuitive conceptual labor than what would be required to live as though diachronic unity were a conceptual fabrication. In other words, diachronic identity is the default for complex creatures like us. I also believe that we do not have a clear enough sense of what is involved in “conceptual imputation” to assume that our helping Sarah recover her past is some sort of 
collective work of the imagination (where “imagination” is understood in terms of 
falsification). Finally, I believe that when Sarah dissociates from the tragic events of her life, and John is nevertheless deeply impacted by those events, he is not mourning a different Sarah than the Sarah who is blissfully unaware of her tragic past. Despite their different narratives, there is simply the tragedy of Sarah’s life that one might uncover upon a larger view of the facts, which means that Sarah can get it wrong about herself.  
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 Now, if we accept, as I do, that it makes more conceptual sense to think in terms of real individuals and real continuant selves, an epistemic problem looms. We have immediate awareness of our own conscious states, but only indirect awareness of other conscious states. I find you grieving, and I am compassionately compelled to reach out and help you. Say that I do so at the expense of my own well-being. There is a general conceptual presupposition underlying this common transaction. I am referring to the fact that I am attuned to your grief, and I am motivated by something that transcends my private experience of grief. One may agree that my concerns can be directed at you and your well-being. But, one may further argue, I am ultimately just chasing the tail of my personal constellation of private feelings and desires. There is an epistemic question of how I come to know and incorporate your motivating feelings into my decisions. Even when I sense that I am motivated by your grief, I had better have access of some form or another to your feelings. Put another way, we had better be able to share our emotional worlds. If I endorse strict, naïve realism about ownership, then we are numerically distinct entities that own our individual psychophysical states. I’ve already explained why this is relevant to ethical actions, but I have not assessed the epistemology of knowing which sorts of motivating reasons drive us. I want to believe that you and 
your needs directly motivate my helping you (in the sense that we can intersubjectively share emotional worlds). If this were not the case, then altruism would be impossible, because I would always be one-step removed from the person whose needs I aim to serve. That does not mean that my actions cannot be described as altruistic. The problem is that the other I wish to serve only exists as if she has 
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feelings and needs that ought to be met. The source of my motivation to help is ultimately me, who has taken this indirectly experienced other as a perceptual object worthy of my consideration—any “source of normativity” that favors helping is grounded in the only values that I directly experience, my own. Thus, a kind of attenuated altruism is possible, but the ground of its value and motivation is fundamentally egocentric. So if a non-egocentric, motivating reason exists, I need to explain how I can know that what motivates me is not something entirely personal, private, and therefore, purely egocentrically present.   This is an iteration of the problem—at the level of motivation and reasons for action—of determining how we intersubjectively share a world of common perceptual objects, like tables, lamps, and meadows, for example. If it is only my grief that is directly present to me, then in the final analysis, I am acting on an egocentric consideration, because the good that guides my action is reflexive and ultimately self-regarding, and only indirectly other-centric. If it is your grief I aim to ameliorate, and I regard your need as intrinsically valid, then it remains to be explained how it might directly compel me in an agentive way. My point is not that we are always psychological egoists. I am making the epistemological point that to conceptually (not just empirically) rule this out, I must know that your grief has real purchase in motivating my action; I must be able to share it with you. And, in terms of value, I must recognize that the source of your value does not rest entirely in me. When it comes to non-egocentric altruistic action, the person that motivates my action needs to be the real and intrinsically valuable other. This is especially true when we admit that the hero may not want to sacrifice herself for a stranger by 
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stepping in front of a bullet, but she can somehow feel compelled (and even obligated) to do so. After all, the claim, “I didn’t want to be a hero, but it felt like the right thing to do…so I did it” is neither empirically unfounded nor logically contradictory. So how do we explain this?   A simple solution is that we do not have any sort of direct access to each 
other’s feelings and motivations, but we can infer them. Inferring the existence of other subjectivities does not provide us with direct access to each other’s feelings. We might explain emotional connectedness through physical mechanisms that in some billiard-ball causal fashion transmit information. From some such model we make progress in the area of, say, mirror-neurons, and these may explain the underlying physical mechanisms that support our capacity to empathize with each other, and in some analogical sense, experience each other’s grief. But in a way, 
we’re left with only a black box. How can these neurons experience, or partly constitute, grief that is both their own and not their own? An account that provides us with some sort of direct connection to each other can both satisfy our ethical need to explain altruistic action—and purge, once and for all, any traces of psychological egoism—while at the same time providing us with an epistemically satisfying account of how we come to know other minds (and thus other states of grief, pain, and sorrow that might motivate us to sacrifice our own well-being for 
another’s advantage). It’s just such an account that I wish to develop here, and in 
order to do so, I’m going to develop my account of selfhood in a way that I hope avoids the usual impasse between Bundle-theories and realism about the self. On the one hand, I wish to preserve the integrity of individual continuant selves, which 
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means that I will not offer a nuanced version of a Bundle-theory that views selves as property tropes related in the right ways. On the other hand, I will also relinquish the belief that our psychophysical states are, strictly speaking, always individually owned under all accurate descriptions of reality.    Let me initially motivate this through an analogy with theoretical physics. Think in terms of the distinct principles that distinguish systems and quantum field theory from linear, mechanistic models. For example, two protons accelerated in a particle accelerator each have measurable motions, and measurable velocities and energy states. They collide and then part ways. Observationally, we find that they still exist, but in their collision, new particles have appeared with measurable masses and electrical charges. Describing this with Newtonian mechanics and 
within the purview of Einstein’s “E = mc2” requires something like the claim that the incident particle motion of the two protons creates new objects. This means that some of the properties of the two colliding protons change into objects. Object/property ontology distinguishes the world of objects from properties, and no element of either transforms into the other. This would be like claiming that the height of the Eiffel tower can somehow transform into another Eiffel tower, or claiming that colliding planets can emerge from their collisions and beget a host of newly created planets (rather than merely broken off fragments of the former planets).13 Quantum field theory makes sense of this by radically departing from the mechanistic interpretation, while more deeply problematizing the notion of                                                       13 I borrow this example, and general description of the physics involved here from 
Bernard d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 15. 
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“creation.” Observationally speaking, we simply do not have a clear formula that quantifies the concept of creation. So, we can instead speak in terms of transition-states of a dynamic system.14 Thus, instead of thinking in terms of metaphysically distinct absolutes (basically, atomistic and mechanistic thinking), we might think in terms of the transition-states of a single system, whereby the creation of a new particle (or individual) is just the transition of one state of a certain “something” into another state. Similarly, I’m recommending that we revise our view of distinct individuals with their private experiences, and examine something like transition-states of a non-linear single system, from which emerge shareable and interconnected emotional phenomena. The caveat is that we can describe this in terms of individuals that nevertheless bear the marks of quantum “non-locality” (that is, they are inherently connected, and in this way “share” information without appeal to mechanistic packets of information being traded at speeds that would have to move faster than the speed of light). This is the substantive difference 
between speaking in terms of “wholes” and speaking in terms of “emptiness” or “no-
self.”    When we’re viewed as numerically and metaphysically distinct entities, the gap between self and other is always looming. In one description of things, each of                                                       14 Ibid., 16: “…let us begin by observing that the notion of creation is not a scientific one: We do not know how to capture it, and even less quantify it. It is therefore appropriate to try and reduce it to something we can master. Now we do master the notions of a system state and changes thereof. We know how to calculate transition 
rates from one state to another. And the brilliant idea…just came from this. It consisted in considering that the existence of a particle is a state of a certain 
“Something,” that the existence of two particles is another state of this same 
“Something,” and so on. Then, the creation of a particle is nothing else than a 
transition from one state of this “Something” to another, and therefore we may hope 
to be able to treat it quantitatively.”  
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us directly experiences our own private mental occurrences; we only indirectly share a world of common perceptual objects. This leaves us in a certain ethical conundrum with respect to determining the authority of egoistic and altruistic reasons. It also generates an epistemological-metaphysical conundrum with respect to our capacity to understand and identify with each other’s grief while simultaneously recognizing the distinction between self and other.   The normative account might provide me with reasons to take your needs seriously by allowing me to see my needs as importantly bound up with your needs. Still, when it comes to reasons for altruistic actions, and compelling, emotively-charged motivations that support such behavior, an issue of identification and knowledge is left to be resolved. Mechanistically speaking, we might resolve this by analogy or inference. But if this proves tenuous, we can explore a metaphysics that is robust enough to provide a real identity between self and other, while preserving the commonsense distinction between individuals. The benefit here is that I can both respect your individuality, and yet truly share states of joy, grief, and pain with you. When I identify with you—or, more accurately, with your motivating suffering—any authority your needs might have in motivating me to act would be as reasonable as tending to my own suffering. But the trick here is not that my self-regarding considerations are really just other-regarding considerations (I explored this option in chapter 3). Rather, under one aspect, I’m able to identify with the whole, and thus be motivated to promote the well-being of the whole, and yet under another aspect, I can see myself as a historical and embodied individual who is distinct from that whole. I can see that at the individual level I might be at a 
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disadvantage in promoting your well-being, but at the same time, I can recognize your well-being as part of my well-being, and vice versa. I do not just reduce the whole of suffering to my own embodied, historical and egocentric existence. I’m able to see a genuine other whom I feel obligated to care for, while at the same time recognizing that the reasons and motivations I have to care for myself (at the individual, egoistic level of embodied existence) may operate at the larger level of the whole: it is not “my” self I am attending to at this larger level, but the shared 
experience of selfhood. In this sense, my empathy and compassionate motivations—and your grief and suffering—can both be “ownerless” with respect to our historical and embodied existence, but also owned within the worldview of an underlying whole, or, dynamic system whereby various transition-states manifest as both particular and non-local.   The key point I’m making here is that the normative account leaves open a 
gap in explaining motivation, and in explaining how we can share conative, 
motivational states. I may be able to provide authoritative reasons for altruism through the normative account, but this relies on a very suspicious claim. For example, John Searle provides a compelling account of why we may have desire-
independent reasons to promote another’s well-being.15 The outcome boils down to this. I believe that you have a reason to help me (if you can do so). My child is drowning, my arms are broken and in casts from a bicycle accident I sustained, and I solicit your help to brave the crashing waves and save him. Given the commitments that come with speech-acts, I can only sensibly call this a “reason to help me” if it                                                       15 Searle, Rationality in Action, chapter 5. 
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applies with universal scope (given various contextual constraints). But, as Searle points out,16 our capacity to be reasonable only makes sense if we are free to be irrational. So, we still need to make sense of an emotive force that compels you to risk your neck for my son. If you choose to ignore my need, then calling your selfishness irrational would not score me many points. You might reply: “Hey, what 
you call a ‘general reason’ is yet to be proven—isn’t that what’s precisely at stake—I have an authoritative reason to avoid the risk of drowning; you have a subjective reason to want me to help you; looks like we’re facing a tragedy here, and for that, 
I’m deeply sorry, but no dice! There’s nothing to adjudicate these competing reasons.” The problem is that you still see things as “me” and “my neck” versus the 
world. I’m not saying you’re wrong in doing so, but I’m asking how it is that you can transcend that basic concern, and share my dismay to such a degree that you go 
after my son. I’m of the mind that it’s not just duty that drives you, or some packet of information from my experience that mechanistically triggers something totally private in you. I want to employ a more metaphysically robust account of how an emotively-charged recognition might motivate you to risk your life for me.    Now, before directly proceeding with my argument, I need to address the central claims I wish to defend. Admittedly, my strategy is precarious because I toggle between an ontologically minimal account of selfhood and an ontologically robust view. But I will do just that.   
 
                                                       16 Ibid., chapter 5. 
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4.4 Two Chief Claims to Defend 
First Claim 
 There are two larger claims I wish to defend here. First, altruism enacts a 
type of freedom. This freedom is of a special sort: altruism shows us that the self is porous, and co-defined in relation to others. In this sense, its content is interdependent and not categorically individuated. And yet, the self is free to individuate itself—that is, autonomous—through the commission of both mundane and extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice. The self is capable of “gifting” itself to take up the cause of another as its own. This is akin to what the literature has called, “The Paradox of Altruism,”17 where the fierce independence and individuality that informs the psychology and praxis of a strongly altruistic person exists in tension with a deep sense of interdependence and emotional identification. Compassion, which I view, in distinction from sympathy, as inherently motivational, allows us to co-participate in an emotive state, and this can transcend the partition between self and other. This transcendence articulates a freedom otherwise unavailable to the empirically limited ego-self. On the other hand, transcendence also articulates a capacity that seems unavailable to certain versions of the No-Self view. The No-Selfer who endorses the view that the first-person stance resists a purely physicalist description has trouble explaining how a bundle or cluster of psychophysical events can account for anything outside that cluster, including, other psychophysical clusters. To genuinely experience the other as someone real and worthy of concern,                                                       17 Robert Paul Churchill and Erin Street, “Is There a Paradox of Altruism?” in The 
Ethics of Altruism, editor Jonathan Seglow (Southgate, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 89-106. 
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as someone whose cause one can feel obligated to take up at one’s own expense, is to be free from the limitations that come with viewing the self solely in terms of first-person immersion and “mineness.” This is one sense in which genuine altruism articulates the porousness and relationality of the self.   The idea of the “relational self” is supported by experiments in developmental psychology that seem to show that a sense of selfhood beyond that of a mere body reacting to stimuli emerges simultaneously with awareness of other selves, and this is evidenced by the infant’s capacity for achieving shared attention and coordination of action and intention with her caretaker even before developing a robust command of language.18 Research has shown that most infants get busy, early-on, coordinating their attention and intentions with their caretakers, whose mental states they in some sense perceive. When we mature and develop an enriched sense of selfhood—with all its intimations of first-person privacy, introspection, and subjectivity—we might more easily believe that we are essentially independent individuals (or uniquely singular and individuated subjectivities), and thus be naturally inclined to believe that our own welfare and sense of the good is somehow privileged (at least with respect to what it makes practical sense to care most about from our own, individual perspectives). But given that the self is only developed in tandem with a sense of other-personness (and not just bare otherness), losing sight of the robust reality of other selves, or, as in the case of severe autism, not robustly sharing attention with or fully recognizing the reality of other subjectivities, means that we have a weaker or more depleted sense of self. Couple                                                       18 See Sorabji, The Self, 24-30.  
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this with the idea that the sacrifices we endure in the altruistic act (however un-heroic or mundane that act may be) require a fairly developed will, one that exercises higher-order volitions in avowing or disavowing various impulses, beliefs, and desires. These higher-order volitions, and the commitments they both presuppose and enact, allow one to justify overwriting the instinct to prioritize 
one’s own welfare at the expense of others. When we remain egoists, entrenched in the belief that the world begins and ends with the individual, then we have not adequately exercised our deeper capacity for identification with others through motivating compassion; we inhibit the flourishing of our autonomy by not robustly enough identifying with a larger whole. Consequently, in this trenchantly egoistic state we are not robust selves, but only “self-ish.”   So the self is porous in both its capacity to identify with others through compassion, and in its capacity to imagine what it’s like to be in another’s shoes through empathic connection. And yet, the self paradoxically individuates itself by exercising its autonomy through self-sacrifice and identification with a larger whole. The self identifies with and is dependent upon the other person, and yet it achieves autonomy and distinction in the face of transcending its own egoistic inclinations. This is a somewhat conceptually unhappy statement, but I am emphasizing that there is a productive tension between identity and difference that arises as the self and other co-emerge. The egoist has the individuation game down, but misses out on the ethically extraordinary (but perhaps developmentally ordinary) capacity to identify with another by exercising the freedom to transcend the naturally egoistic compulsion.  
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 Why do I call this “freedom”? I do so because both the embodied state of being a self, which individuates us into personal beings with very personal histories, and the immersive sense of occupying a first-person stance naturally direct our attention to what is in the closest psychological and physical proximity: our own 
ego-selves, with their occurrent needs and desires. However, there is a tyranny at work in this proximity, because when the inward gaze falls too far into the rabbit hole of private, first-person experiences, it is both metaphysically and epistemically limited. What it can know, and consequently what it can do is limited; it shuts itself off from a whole range of experiences that are generated by compassionately communing with another. Over-emphasizing individuation threatens to perniciously limit the greater range of possibilities that are inherently open to one who identifies 
with a larger whole. So I am not using “freedom” in a completely libertarian Kantian 
sense. I’m also including creative and imaginative freedom in my account of what it means to identify with something larger than the private ego-self. This is the first big claim I wish to defend.  
Second Claim 
 Second, while I applaud the general Buddhist view that the self is not a single 
thing, whose essence is thinking (a la Cartesianism) or any other such singularly defining property, I believe that certain Mahāyāna Buddhist accounts of selfhood do not sufficiently support their chief practical aim, namely, altruistic compassion. This is due, in large part, to certain weaknesses in their understanding of selfhood. While I believe that some of these same weaknesses exist in contemporary reductionistic theories of selfhood, and some contemporary minimalist views of selfhood, 
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critiquing the weaknesses in the Buddhist views will be instructive, since their points of emphasis do not necessarily overlap with contemporary debates. The 
various Buddhist views I’ve developed here have not adequately accounted for what we mean by “selves.” I contend that the requirements of “having a self” (or better, 
being a self) are, from an ontologically minimalist perspective, bound up with normativity and participation. And, as we cannot have normativity without others, that is, without a public space, we can in some sense say that the self is constructed out of its normative and participant relationships. Normativity is essentially bound up with sharing a public space; thus, an adequate notion of self must include the individual in the context of its meaningful relationships to others, which in turn requires thinking of the self as self-other. However, rather than appealing to the relational view to derive the conclusion that the self is “empty” or “without self” (in the sense developed in the minimalist reading of Madhyamaka), we might instead view the self as something real, but also something far more extensive than the personal histories of individual egos. The self plays the role of unifier.  Be that as it may, selfishness is only possible against a background of shared space that is inherently imbued with normative requirements. These emergent requirements reveal the self as porous and always-already co-emergent with others. Getting a better handle on what constitutes selfhood means getting clearer about the inherent normativity and other-centric requirements involved in being a self. 
These “rules of engagement” are not directly desire-dependent or egocentric in nature. That is, I can only have self-regarding considerations against a background of other-regarding considerations, and these latter considerations are not ultimately 
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derivative of (in the sense of being less fundamental than) egocentric considerations; they co-arise with other-regarding considerations that are experienced and logically situated as being “externally” binding. This is another sense in which I claim that the self is “porous” and thus “open” to others by its very nature. So my case does not rest on moral psychology, alone, but also accommodates normativity, which is the condition for the possibility of communicating and coordinating action through language. The space created between self and other presupposes a background of mutuality and co-creation. Borrowing from my discussion of Levinasian-inspired “otherness” in chapter 3, I should add that this mutuality is inherently imbued with a sense of ethical command. That is, I am not only with others, but also in some sense obligated to respond to others as a basic feature of my encountering someone who cannot be fully reduced to a quantity or a mere object.   On the other hand, I will develop an account here that goes beyond the normative self, and I do this to make better sense of the phenomenology of mutuality and identification with the other. So in what follows, I will support the view that altruism is reasonable based on an analysis of the normative self, and I will also show how a felt (and thus motivating) altruistic obligation may be the upshot of a specific metaphysics. The heart of this dissertation lies in these two big claims.    In the next section, I will briefly take stock of the specific uses of the No-Self 
thesis I’ve covered throughout this dissertation. I’ll do so by more specifically addressing two Buddhist schools of philosophy that have been central to the 
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intellectual-dialogical history of Indian philosophy and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: 
Vasubandhu’s (c. 4th century CE) Abhidharma-Sautrāntika metaphysics, and 
Nāgārjuna’s (c. 2nd century CE) and Śāntideva's (c. 8th century CE) Madhyamaka minimalism and deconstruction. This dissertation has not pretended to provide in-depth hermeneutics for these complex schools of Buddhist thought. I have rationally reconstructed much of what I’ve developed here as a preparatory work supporting further research in the ethical ramifications of contemporary theories of selfhood. Altruism and compassion are central practical concepts in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, because Mahāyāna Buddhism (at least in the texts I’ve covered here, 
particularly in Śāntideva) believes that altruistic motivations are in some sense a natural (if not logical) outcome of experientially recognizing the unreality of the self. Thus, deriving an agent-neutral and altruistic ethics from a revisionary metaphysics of selfhood is arguably a major philosophical program in Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna, 
and to some extent, Theravāda texts. So there is much to be gained by bringing this program into conversation with the contemporary scene by extracting its more general and controversial philosophical commitments. While one cannot entirely ignore responsible philology, I have examined these texts as a philosopher and not an expert Sanskritist, philologist, or student of religious studies.    With that in mind, I will also assess another set of controversial philosophical contentions endorsed by the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century CE). 
Dharmakīrti endorsed a brand of idealism, or, what’s been called in the classical 
Indian tradition, “mind only” (citamātra) metaphysics. While for Dharmakīrti the self is not real, he developed a philosophy of mind whereby mental occurrences are 
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self-reflexive and momentary, and he argued that the concept of selfhood emerges out of the self-reflexive nature of these momentary mental occurrences. For 
Dharmakīrti, mental occurrences are self-illuminating, that is, mental occurrences are inherently aware of their own awareness. Perceptual objects like tables, chairs, and lamps are a function of these self-reflexive and self-illuminating mental 
episodes externalizing themselves as “other.” Thus, Dharmakīrti collapses the ultimate distinction between subject and object. While Dharmakīrti must make sense of how these insulated and momentary occurrences relate and individuate themselves as the continuous stream of an individual self experiencing a world of external objects, he must also make sense of how an individuated stream of consciousness can come to experience other selves outside that stream. Thus, 
Dharmakīrti faces the task of explaining the experience of otherness in general, and the experience of other selves, in particular. The 10th century Kashmiri Śaivite, Abhinavagupta, leveled some damning critiques against Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics. I believe that the upshot of those critiques provides a fresh solution for making sense of other-centricity and altruism. I have argued that the link between Bundle and No-Self theories on the one hand, and agent-neutrality and altruism on the other, are not so logically compelling. So I’ll begin by defending the second big claim I made, my claim that the Buddhist No-Self view (anātman) does not have the resounding ethical implications many Buddhist thinkers believe it does. I will then go on to develop an account of otherness by using Dharmakīrti as a foil. I contend that my account provides a unique view of how we can come to know each other and come to share motivating feelings. These shared feelings can motivate altruistic 
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action, because they transcend ownership, and are therefore not derivative of (in the sense of being less fundamental than) the egocentric concerns of the agent who is motivated by them. Moreover, in so far as these shared feelings disclose an original, albeit not always consciously recognized unity, egocentric concerns are in this sense less fundamental because they presuppose background unity. I will elaborate on this in the final sections of this essay. For now, I will turn again to various general forms of the Buddhist No-Self view.  
4.5.1 The Practical Inadequacies of the Anātman Thesis: Critique of Chapter 3   What can a Buddhist mean by claiming that there is no self? I utilized 
Ganeri’s taxonomy in chapter 2 to sort out some of the ways in which the No-Self claim has logically functioned in the corpus of Buddhist texts. Let me now move from some general forms of this claim to more specific developments of the claim in the tradition of Buddhist philosophy.   While we may be tempted to believe that the No-Self view more generally refers to the absence of a Cartesian soul-self, and that No-Selfism is an attack against substance dualism, the view in the Buddhist context is more pointed and controversial. For example, one reading of the early Buddhist metaphysician, Vasubandhu, would have him argue that the term, “I” is not ultimately meaningful, even if it does provide some pragmatic use. For Vasubandhu and the early 
Ābhidharmikas (Buddhist metaphysicians), what we’ve erroneously taken to be a self is a complex and dynamic relationship among physical structures (rūpa) and a host of intentionalistic, mental phenomena. Buddhists claim that five skandhas, or, 
“heaps” of psychophysical phenomena produce the erroneous belief in a self. These 
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heaps consist of the following: physical matter and forms of experience (rūpa), affectively-charged perception (vedanā), normatively-relevant patterns of conceptual imputation (samjñā), normatively-relevant patterns of behavior underlying a sense of agency (samskāra), and the capacity to synthesize over diverse modalities of sensory input (vijñāna). This makes up a psychophysical 
“stream” (saṅtāna) of consciousness. The stream is the base/locus (āśraya), or, metaphysical base of individuation, while the “place” of this occurrence (ādhāra)—that which characterizes ownership of this dynamic complex—is metaphysically unreal. This is what Ganeri referred to as “No-Self View 2” (see chapter 2). So according to this view, ownership is unreal when assessing things from the ultimate, 
metaphysical perspective. However, “the mind” is not reducible to ultimately atomic physical structures. Mental phenomena are metaphysically distinct from physical phenomena. So this form of the No-Self view is anything but monistic and physicalist in nature. The chief point Vasubandhu raises with respect to the self is that it is an ethically pernicious error imputed over a dynamic relationship between mental and physical occurrences. Uncovering this error is both morally instructive and essential to Buddhist soteriology. Thus, while there may be many contemporary agnostics and atheists who believe in the meaningfulness of the term, “self,” without believing in the existence of a soul, Vasubandhu would argue that emphasizing the importance of the concept of self is ethically insidious, because it contributes to egocentric and selfish behavior, and it is anathema to Buddhist soteriology.    Now, I gave some strong reasons in chapter 1 why I believe ownership is essential for making sense of the human experience, both metaphysically and socio-
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linguistically. But we can still ask how Vasubandhu and other No-Selfers of his ilk consider this revisionary metaphysical view to be ethically illuminating and ethically liberating. In chapter 2, I covered some ways in which a Parfitian spin on this view might provide important ethical upshots concerning the nature of responsibility and punishment. But what normative value can the Buddhist view provide? What sort of ethical traction can a revision of essentialism about the self provide? In terms of the question of altruism and its practical and ethical role, it becomes two questions: How does this make sense of the felt, obligatory nature of altruism?  How does this justify altruism? While there may be some creative ways to account for altruism in the stream view of Buddhist No-Selfism, there has been an ongoing debate as to its normative applicability (as I illustrated in chapter 2). The ethical traction of normative-ethical requirements, especially as they pertain to any sort of altruistic mandate (if one exists), does not straightforwardly follow from the view that the experience of being a real continuant self is a conceptual fabrication.  However, I’ll try to motivate yet another way in which one might think that experiencing the unreality of the self leads to a normative conclusion. I will ultimately reject this strategy, but I do believe that, at least on the surface, it has some viability. I will develop this strategy by more precisely addressing the foil to this argument in the next section, namely, ethical egoism. I will examine whether ethical egoism is a moral theory (or simply a theory that undermines ethics altogether), and I will also argue that the theory is not a straw man; ethical egoism, at least on the surface, is a real contender, albeit a terribly flawed contender.  
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4.5.2 Numerical Distinction and the Egoist’s Strategy  Egocentric considerations arguably only make sense against the background belief that the ego perdures in some form or another. This is the “extreme claim” I discussed in chapter 3, and as I said there, it is usually wedded to the “me-consideration.” For example, when I consider the interests (understood more narrowly as needs rather than mere urges or inclinations) of a stranger, I am obviously forward-looking in my concerns. I care about what will happen to that person if deprived of her basic needs. Similarly, part of the reason I care about my future suffering is that it will be me who suffers in the future. While the logical importance of continuance (also called in the metaphysical literature, “persistence”) is the common factor in both cases, there is a disanalogy between self and other here. I can be temporally-neutral with respect to my own needs, that is, I can believe that I have good reasons now to delay opportunities and gratifications to promote the needs of my future self, because I am (or will be) that future-self. While my current socialist-leaning inclinations might view the needs of a future bourgeois-me as less than motivating, recognizing that it will be me makes some practical difference in my life now. I might still delay certain gratifications to ensure that some important needs are met for my future-self (especially when it comes to the fitness and health of my body and brain-functions). When it comes to the stranger whose needs I consider, I cannot say the same thing. The person I care about now may transform so radically that I have little reason to care about or work to promote her future. In the first case, there is a metaphysical relationship between me-now and the needs of my future-self that makes a practical difference about what I 
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should care about, but in the second case, that continuity does not exist. Thus, I cannot in any straightforward sense claim that the egoist is inconsistent in being temporally neutral with respect to prudential reasons, but agent-relative with respect to reasons for action overall (as Derek Parfit argues in Part I of Reasons and 
Persons). Caring about an overall state of affairs, as is the case in agent-neutral ethical systems, is substantively distinct from caring about the overall state of my temporally stretched life.   One might counter that this asymmetry is not ethically relevant. Just because I will not be Sally, but (trivially speaking) I will be myself, does not warrant ethically privileging my needs over Sally’s. A description of the logic and metaphysics of forward-looking agency does not necessarily entail a normative claim about who or what one ought to privilege. However, I can counter by pointing out that the strongest and most immediate reason to promote the needs of my future-self is that my life is intrinsically worthwhile, and the future will be another stage of that intrinsically worthwhile whole. If my life is intrinsically worthwhile to me now, then I simply care about my well-being as whole. When considering this in terms of time, there is no reason to favor one stage of that whole over another (I am, of course, bracketing discussions about how quality of life determines its worthiness; I am addressing the fact that we care that our lives have quality, and that normally our lives are simply valuable to us, which is why suicide is rarely a flippant act, but usually includes considerable conflict). But I do not have the same neutrality when it comes to others, because, to some extent, their worth and well-being is conditional in a way that my own is not. I can certainly feel shame when comparing my lifestyle 
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and choices now with the values and choices of my former self. Self-loathing may reach such a pathological point that I consider or attempt suicide. But this is a much more difficult prospect than damning a formerly respected friend who has become a brutal and morally depraved leader (we can imagine what the Jewish art dealer, Max Rothman must have felt when the eccentric Austrian artist he took under his wing became the monstrous Fuhrer of Germany). I can more easily disregard the well-being of a former friend who has now become a moral monster than I can disregard my own well-being (moral monster or not).  In other words, I require a reason of a different order that justifies my caring about another’s well-being. However in my own case, whatever adds to the case that I should care about my future, an essential presupposition is fulfilled in advance, namely, that it will be my intrinsically worthwhile future to care about. While this might not directly support the conclusion that ethical egoism is a superior normative theory, it certainly provides some support for the view that any other-regarding considerations I take seriously are less authoritative than self-regarding and prudential reasons. Thus, any action that promotes the needs of others at considerable expense to my own needs ought to raise a serious red flag. When I understand myself in terms of being a continuant self that is numerically distinct from all other selves, the worth of my own life shows up to me in a way that it does not with respect to others, and this makes a practical difference in considering who or what I ought to care about.   There are some objections to the picture I’ve developed here that I need to consider, and in doing so I will make the controversial claim that ethical egoism is not just a theory about ethics that denies the need for ethics; ethical egoism can be 
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construed as a contending ethical theory. The first objection is that one does not have an ethical reason to care about one’s future, only a prudential reason. So, again, it is of little concern to ethics that we value self-maintenance and well-being in a qualitatively different way than we value the well-being of others. Now, if it were true that prudential reasons are substantively distinct from ethical reasons (in the sense that the former sorts of reasons have no bearing on what it makes ethical sense to do), then it would seem that only other-regarding and non-prudential reasons count as ethical reasons, which would mean that ethics may overlap with but need not fundamentally include prudential reasons. But then, when considering conflicts that arise due to the demandingness of ethical reasons, we would need to arbitrate between two distinct domains, and it would be difficult to determine which sorts of principles (neither prudential nor ethical) could mediate the dispute. 
It’s better if the two sorts of reasons are more closely related. But I will elaborate on this after addressing the second objection. The second, and closely related, objection is that the claim that other-regarding considerations are somehow “derivative” of prudential reasons is absurd. What would such a “derivation” even look like? More 
importantly, if this were the case, then sacrificing one’s life would always be an error. I do not believe that the primacy of prudential reasons would entail that self-sacrifice is always an error, but I do believe that ethical egoism fails to provide a convincing account of situations in which self-sacrifice serves absolutely no prudential concerns. So the spirit of this objection is spot-on and damning for ethical egoism. I will develop this further in the following section. 
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4.5.3 Motivating Ethical Egoism  Consider the following two statements:   (1) Over all, things will be better for me if I do X.   (2) Over all, the world will be better if I do Y.   The first is a self-regarding consideration, and the second is a consideration for the greater good. We can modify (1), and state it this way:   (1)’ Over all, I will suffer less if I do X.   Qualifying this in terms of pleasure and pain (taking “suffer” in a narrow sense) allows us to call this an egocentric-hedonistic consideration. Likewise, we can modify (2), and state it this way:   (2)’ Over all, S will suffer less if I do X, and I am not S.   We can call this an other-centric consideration that can be agent-specific (where S = an individual) or group-specific (where S = a group of individuals). Now augment this other-centric formula as follows:  (3) S suffers less when I do X, and I believe I will suffer and things will be worse for me overall if I do X.  This is now an altruistic consideration. In this case, I weigh the burden of suffering more for the sake of others, without pursuing any ulterior self-regarding goals.     The problem I’ve been examining throughout this essay has centered on 
whether or not either the collection of egocentric considerations (1) and (1)’, or non-egocentric considerations (2) and (2)’ and (3) possess some authority the other lacks. One obvious position is that neither enjoys ultimate authority; rather, context 
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should determine whether it makes sense to suffer some amount for the greater good or whether one should forgo considerations of the greater good to suffer less. Likewise, in the case of altruistic considerations, context may dictate whether it is reasonable to suffer for the sake of another without believing one will gain a personal advantage by doing so. While altruistic considerations are a species of other-centric considerations, problems that arise with considerations of the greater good and problems that arise with altruistic considerations may be distinct. Suppose I grab a stranger from the clutches of an angry dog, believing I will be considerably mauled in the process, and believing that I have nothing to directly gain for myself by doing so. I am in fact mauled, and in some description of the world, it would have in fact been better for everyone that the stranger be mauled rather than me. In this case, I am not sacrificing anything for the greater good, nor do I intend to sacrifice anything for the greater good. But I am acting altruistically. So on what grounds would it make sense to do such a thing? Can I only appeal to compassion, conditioning, or sentimentality? If I do not believe that in any ultimate sense I hold a privileged position in this world, then surely, I don’t imagine that this stranger holds 
an ultimately privileged position. While it’s a tragedy he should suffer, it’s likewise a tragedy that I should suffer. There seems to be no rational grounds for claiming that I ought to act altruistically. I may in fact be conditioned or disposed to behave in such a way, but that does not directly count as a rational justification for my behavior, as I can be conditioned or disposed to act in any number of ways.   Why is this important for normative ethics? An ethical egoist may claim that any action one takes ought to benefit oneself in some way. If we put things in terms 
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of “maximization,” an ethical egoist may claim that maximizing one’s own self-interest (however we construe the latter) ought to have ultimate authority in dictating what actions one ought to take. Consider the objection that a system prioritizing prudential reasons is not an ethical system. It would follow that ethical egoism can’t be a contending ethical theory, because it clearly prioritizes prudential reasons above all else. We might view ethical egoism as a reactive position, particularly with respect to agent-neutral systems like utilitarianism. These systems claim that actions promoting the greater good of those relevantly affected are the right actions to take. Reacting to this, the ethical egoist might simply claim that one has a right to opt out of such sacrifices. But Kantian ethics—which would not sanction treating a person as only a means for some larger good—makes a similar claim, and Kantian ethics are surely not foundationally egocentric. So what sort of claim is the ethical egoist trying to make? I suggest that we more charitably read the 
egoist’s claim as a sincere, normative-ethical claim: one ought to favor states of affairs in which one in some way does better for oneself. The “ought” must be a 
moral “ought” rather than a prediction or description of what one would do (which would conflate a psychological thesis with a substantive, normative-ethical thesis).19                                                         19 This is a central problem that Korsgaard identifies with some confused, contemporary versions of egoism. The problem is that one might conflate what is supposed to be a minimalist view of practical rationality construed as purely instrumental reason—the view that in some broad sense we are always pursuing our own good (psychological egoism)—with the substantive, normative claim that we ought to pursue our own good. The purely descriptive claim is distinct from the prescriptive claim, and the latter is hardly self-evident, especially considering the complexity involved in ranking our own preferences. See, Christine M. Korsgaard, 
“The Myth of Egoism,” in Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, eds. Peter Baumann and Monika Betzler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 57-91. 
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 Now, in a toss-up situation in which I can either rescue the other person at considerable losses to myself (with no foreseeable material gains for myself), or I can simply avoid the situation (and thereby gain the benefit of suffering less than doing otherwise), I seem to have a strong intuitive reason to favor the latter. Given that neither of us is ultimately privileged, and I have not, in advance, endorsed utilitarianism, I can defer to intuition (which, ex hypothesi, favors prudence). My life matters to me, and avoiding suffering whenever I reasonably can seems to be plain common sense. In other words, agent-relative reasons seem more basic and more intuitively palatable and motivational than agent-neutral reasons. Agent-relative reasons may be construed as follows:  (AR): For any agent A (A ought to favor an uncentered state of affairs in which A_____).  Agent-neutral reasons can be construed as follows:  (AN): For any agent A (A ought to favor the uncentered state of affairs W).   The first sort of reason includes A while the second is dictated by some state of affairs that does not reflexively include A. Utilitarianism operates by agent-neutral reasons. One way of defending altruistic actions is by appealing to an agent-neutral utilitarian calculation in which one ought to do X, because it would serve the greater good, and by doing X, one incurs considerable losses (with no long-term material advantage gained for the agent by incurring such losses). So utilitarianism, to some extent, requires the cultivation of an altruistic disposition. This virtuous disposition would allow one to make the necessary personal sacrifices sometimes needed for securing the greater good.  
 201 
 In response, an ethical egoist might provide some intuitive arguments that do justice to our overwhelming concern for our individual well-being. First, our lives matter to us in a viscerally personal way. Our own suffering matters to us in a viscerally personal way, and we do not usually deliberate too deeply over whether or not to avoid our own suffering; on the contrary, we require more convincing to knowingly suffer for some cause or long-term goal. However, when it comes to 
considering another’s suffering, that sort of immediacy is often lacking. My suffering even a minor laceration by an angry dog is viscerally immediate in a way that the mauling of a hundred thousand others will never be for me, and that is mostly because I recognize and experience my own suffering directly, but when it comes to 
another’s suffering, that is not the case. The egoist might claim that knowledge of 
another’s suffering is derivative (in the sense of being indirect) rather than foundational (in the sense of being immediate). One can never directly experience 
another’s suffering, but at best, one can only imagine such suffering (however vividly one might do so). In this way, empathy is instructive to the extent that it allows one to envision what it might be like to suffer from another’s point of view. 
So egoism honors the derivative nature of understanding another’s pain. Therefore, 
motivational and epistemic asymmetry exists between one’s own and another’s suffering, and egoism honors that asymmetry.  Second, we do not want our preferred ethical system to be overly demanding (“ought” implies reasonable accommodation of our more stubbornly ingrained dispositions and ways of being). So, motivationally speaking, egoism reasonably accommodates our commonsense desire to avoid our own suffering and avoid ethical systems that are unpalatably 
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demanding. Finally, there may be irreducibly egocentric-hedonistic considerations that can never harmonize with considerations for the greater good. In such cases, one favors a state of affairs in which one suffers less, and favoring such a state of affairs does not bring about a maximally better state of affairs (that is, it does not serve the greater good). This means that there are powerfully motivated self-regarding considerations that reveal a stubborn and unbridgeable divide between egocentric-hedonistic and non-egocentric considerations. Say that I suffer from amnesia from a terrible accident, and in the hospital, I come to know that KPM rather than John Doe will suffer a terribly painful life-altering surgery. I reason that I must either be KPM or JD. I will naturally prefer that I am JD. I usually do not need a further reason for favoring a state of affairs in which I suffer less, but I do require some further convincing to favor a state of affairs in which I suffer more (for an individual or for the greater good). Ethical egoism honors these basic asymmetries; 
it’s a practical system that tethers ethical sanctions and commissions to the intuition that each of us matters to ourselves in a motivationally intense and basic way, and sacrificing our individual well-being for another must in some way provide us with an emotional, social, or value-driven pay-off that substantively includes our own flourishing (or good or whatever). Ethical egoism may even provide a utilitarian-leaning argument. The ethical egoist might claim that self-abnegation is a more harmful social disposition to cultivate (with less optimal pay-offs for the greater social good). She may argue that self-respect, in the form of prioritization of the betterment of the self within the strictures of a functioning social framework, requires mostly prioritizing self-regarding considerations. So, this is not a 
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philosophy of blind selfishness, but rather a philosophy of self-development, with 
positive “trickle-down” ramifications for the social whole. Our libertarian friends remind us that we gain more from the innovative spirit of self-possessed citizens than we do from condescending welfare bureaucrats and emotionally impulsive altruists: when the meek inherit the earth, they inherit a meek earth hindered by an erosion of creative and innovative possibilities (we need only think of Mill and Nietzsche, who provided some thinking in this direction).    Now, ethical egoism should not be conflated with psychological egoism, the view that an agent is always motivated directly by self-interest. What it does claim is that when one is in a toss-up situation, it requires more complex deliberation to justify suffering for the sake of another than it does to justify protecting oneself 
from avoidable suffering. It may be the case that I’m simply wired or conditioned to engage in more other-centric and altruistic actions, and in this sense strong psychological egoism is false; I’m certainly not always directly motivated by self-regarding considerations. However, the ethical egoist may respond that: (1) the world would be a better place if each individual mostly prioritized their own self-interest within the strictures of a stable social order; (2) most of our common sense moral judgments are consistent with egoism (that is, we can account for many of our moral norms by appeal to self-interest pursuing social strategies for self-flourishing); (3) given the strong weight of prudential reasons for action, ethical egoism is not an overly demanding ethical theory that goes against the grain of the human condition.    
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 Now, consider the objection that ethical egoism entails that self-sacrifice is always wrong. Say that I do myself considerable harm (and very nearly drown) to save a drowning stranger. I’m not a lifeguard or medic or first-responder, just an ordinary guy. The nuanced ethical egoist does not claim that it is always morally wrong to act without directly furthering my self-interest (so that by risking my neck for the drowning swimmer I’ve done something ethically bad, which would be a ridiculous claim). She might argue that altruistic deeds have some conventional nobility, and in some way further my social position and my personal interest staked in being, say, a courageous hero. After all, the ethical egoist is not a megalomaniac, and thus, an ordinary ethical egoist responds to and develops values out of her socially-attuned and socially-situated nature. Of course, if my action is strongly motivated by my personal vision of the good life, which includes being a hero who pursues dangerous deeds, then the action is not purely other-centric. But 
that’s fine, because we can at least provide a reason for pursuing an altruistic action that would otherwise remain mysterious (or at very least, difficult to rationally justify) without ignoring the evidence that people often do take such actions. This need not be a case of psychological egoism, because the self-regarding considerations that come with my personal vision of the good life are not always in the forefront of my consciousness, nor did they need to be when I took the plunge. However, at some point in my career as an agent, values that fulfill my self-regarding concern for realizing the best life possible for me have conditioned my dispositions, the motivations of which are now transparent. In this case, the ethical 
egoist might claim that I’ve acted consistently with my vision of the good life, and 
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pursuing this daring deed makes my life qualitatively better (albeit at a considerable quantitative risk).     However, one may object that this picture conflates prudential reasons with ethical reasons. Surely the ethical egoist is not committed to believing that all prudential reasons (and ultimately self-regarding reasons) are ethical reasons. To avoid this embarrassing problem, the ethical egoist would have to claim that not all first-order prudential reasons are ethical reasons, but insofar as there are ethical reasons for doing things, they must in some way appeal to (or at very least provide a structure for more adequately satisfying) prudential reasons. For example, I take important time away from my family and my money-paying projects to help a student struggling in my class. Whether the student does well will not in this context make one bit of material difference to my life. My reasons for helping this person are transparent—it just seems like the right thing to do (and not just because of my normatively relevant social role as an instructor, for in this case, I believe I’ve delivered amply on that front). But my now transparent disposition to help is a function of social training, and a strong explanatory candidate for my taking to such training (other than by direct force or threats) is that such character-dispositions achieve some sort of personal pay-off for me in terms of the overall quality of my life. This works well with the view that ethical reasons are ultimately grounded in social conventions that in one way or another allow individuals to thrive in communities by harmonizing their more immediate self-regarding reasons with social goods that provide a relatively stable framework for satisfying such reasons. In short, ethical reasons are grounded in larger, rational reasons for action. When 
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we distinguish between first-order and second-order reasons, we can avoid the embarrassing conclusion that ethical reasons are only prudential reasons. The point is that ethical reasons are derivative (in the sense of being explained and justified by other sorts of reasons), and prudential reasons provide the justificatory soil out of which ethical reasons emerge.   
 In terms of the stated objections previously considered, the ethical egoist can say the following. First, prudential and ethical reasons are closely related, but not identical. Ethical reasons have very little traction when too far removed from prudential reasons, and if ethics is to be a rational enterprise, it must be grounded in rational self-interest, which is socially-situated and sensitive to group dynamics. Complex, second-order ethical reasons are far less mysterious when we recognize how they ideally accommodate first-order prudential reasons. When the context radically shifts, and the relationship between first-order prudential and second-order ethical reasons is radically compromised, ethics becomes overly demanding and irrational. So, while the two sorts of reason are not identical, ethical reasons make rational sense by dovetailing out of prudential reasons. This explains why care of the self takes on ethical tones, where the line between prudential self-maintenance and ethical obligation can become fuzzy if not overlapping.    Second, ethical egoism can be an ethical system to the extent that it sufficiently accommodates our intuitive moral judgments (not to steal, lie, murder, etc.). Like all candidates for a good theory, it must convincingly explain the evidence (in this case, common moral judgments and their properties). Ethical egoism claims that prioritizing self-interest provides a credible principle from which to justify 
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other-regarding considerations. When all goes well, other-regarding considerations advance long-term self-interest and quality of life for the individual.    Ultimately, I disagree with this account. However, the ethical egoist might 
argue that reciprocity and cooperation, and the sense of obligation to fulfill one’s roles in such relationships, works on an egoistic foundation, because it suits one’s prudential interest to cooperate. Acting as if your needs have independent (or intrinsically valid) worth ultimately serves my long-term self-interest. Ethical egoism claims that it is right that we prioritize long-term interest, and that we ought to do so. Randian thinking would even claim that the world is better for such thinking. Thus, ethical egoism should not be confused for “blind egoism,” or, narcissistic megalomania, which would not count as an ethical theory at all. Moreover, the ethical egoist does not necessarily conflate her normative system with psychological egoism, but the system is certainly consistent with and buttressed by the psychological claim. If we were fundamentally motivated to prioritize self-interest above all other concerns (which Butler and others have shown us is conceptually problematic and empirically false), then ethical egoism is a better explanatory, empirical theory about what constitutes a morally good action. Therefore, ethical egoism is not an a-moral theory. However, it may be a bad theory.  Finally, in terms of self-sacrifice always being an error, the ethical egoist may claim that an individual might rationally develop character traits that value risk and danger, which are always premised on the possibility of loss, severe harm, or even death. These become transparent values that in some way improve the quality of the 
said individual’s life. So “self-sacrifice” is extreme risk that from a third-person 
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perspective is describable as sacrifice, but is only the outcome of a gambler suffering the ultimate loss. But I find this to be a weak response, since we have plenty of empirical examples of parents and loved ones directly sacrificing their lives for their nearest and dearest (where the only risk involved is in whether the sacrifice actually serves its purpose of saving the child or loved one). And, more importantly, we have empirical examples of individuals directly sacrificing their lives for complete strangers (where bias for loved ones falls from the equation). But the problem is that while not all acts of apparent self-sacrifice are always bad, the egoist seems to be committed to at least some of them being bad, and it is absurd to claim that these bad cases are premised on whether the sacrifice promotes the quality of the 
sacrificer’s life. If it is part of the sacrificer’s vision of the good life, then unless the egoist can show that this vision always serves the sacrificer in some substantive way, what we have here is a genuinely other-centric concern that values the overall 
state of things rather than just one’s own individual plight. Moreover, ethical egoism would radically part with the commonsense view that when, say, an adult occupant 
of an Aleppo apartment, which is under a bombing siege, rescues a stranger’s child from the apartment, knowing that it will most likely cost her own life, her action is not morally praiseworthy. The staunch egoist must view this as either a morally blameworthy act, or an instance of calculated risk that went wrong. Both alternatives seem intuitively absurd. I believe that this is a damning objection to the theory. Nevertheless, if the ethical egoist simply bites the bullet on acts of self-sacrifice, we might provide a counter-argument that strikes at the core of the 
theory’s metaphysical presuppositions.   
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4.5.4 A Rationally Reconstructed Buddhist Response  This is where the Buddhist might claim that the No-Self view has important ethical implications. She might claim that seeing through the illusion of a perduring ego removes the basic asymmetry that drives one to endorse the egocentric conclusion. Strictly speaking, a psychophysical stream accounts for the individuality that one believes is “owned” by one’s ego, or, “I-maker” (ahaṅkara). But the ego is only illusorily permanent; it is nothing but the sort of fleeting perceptions that Hume saw when he tried to introspectively verify the existence of a single and perduring self. For the Buddhists, the belief that one owns one’s mental and physical states is an error resulting from the ego’s belief that it is a permanent and fixed being underlying the career of the self. So perhaps the asymmetry dissolves with the experientially and conceptually recognized dissolution of ego-ownership. Now, if one claims that this dissolution might dissolve any reason one has whatsoever to 
care about anyone’s future (the “extreme,” moral-nihilism claim), we might employ 
something like Siderits’s argument (see chapter 2 for the argument Siderits has 
developed in reconstructing Śāntideva’s work). No one, strictly speaking, owns the stream of psychophysical events. Although ownership is an illusion, suffering, and its ethically-negative valence, is not. Thus, if a mandate exists to thwart needless pain-and-suffering events, it must operate over the whole of sentient fields of suffering, because no one can really claim ownership over a particular stream. With this argument, altruism becomes a basic mandate only (seemingly) trumped by practical and pragmatic considerations. For example, it may be most expedient in some instances to reduce the overall sum of suffering by privileging “my own” 
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suffering at the expense of another’s. However, the general mandate operates in a utilitarian-teleological fashion, and only justifies privileging oneself toward the end of reducing the overall sum of suffering.    I addressed rebuttals and counter-rebuttals to this line of argument in chapter 2. But the most damning problem I see here is that it’s not so clear that a 
“general mandate” to thwart suffering makes any sense when we dissolve ownership of suffering. Arguably, suffering is not the sort of thing that just hangs 
there, and even if it does, it’s not clear how and why it’s so bad when it’s not connected to the very real deprivation and anguish of an individual with a very real history and future that she cares about. In other words, the sort of existential anguish Buddhists seek to liberate us from, is articulated in the complex and concrete conventional relationships of transactional human existence. When we view things from the ownerless, ultimate perspective, we lose sight of the meaning 
of “suffering and anguish.” These terrible experiences emerge in a meaningful , social whole, and without viewing things from the perspective of our conventional identities, suffering loses its ethically-relevant valence. If Vasubandhu or Śāntideva want to argue that ownership and selfhood are not necessary to make sense of pain and suffering, they still should show how, from the ultimate perspective, any sort of deontic claims can be made about such suffering. They may argue that it’s a natural facet (svabhāva) of suffering that “it ought to be thwarted.” But for Śāntideva, the 
Mādhyamika, it’s hard to understand what that would mean, since the premise of his Buddhist philosophy is the Nāgārjunian view that nothing whatsoever has an intrinsic nature (niṣvabhāva). Now, if it’s convention that determines our normative-
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ethical relationship to pain and suffering, then why not just claim that it’s convention that produces asymmetry between self-regarding and other-regarding considerations, the very asymmetry needed in a defense of egocentric privileging? 
This is the “cherry-picking” problem I highlighted in chapter 2 (see Harris’s 
argument). The fact is, both Vasubandhu and Śāntideva will have to appeal to convention to win us back ethical relationships and normativity, and unless we 
provide a creative spin on “otherness” (the sort I developed in chapter 3), it’s hard to see how the claim that there is no self provides us with a normative-ethical justification for altruism. Moreover, the Buddhist would also have to appeal to convention to make sense of any practical (or purely rational) principles for justifying altruism.    While I’m obviously amenable to the view of otherness that I spun in chapter 3, I believe it has some serious shortcomings. If this is the case, then I’ve just about spun-out on forging a directly practical link between the No-Self thesis in Buddhism and any sort of normative grip that altruistic action may hold over us. I will now explain where I believe these shortcomings lie.  In chapter 3, I argued that Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, understood as deflationary minimalism, is not commited to the belief in a perduring self, nor is it committed to Bundle-theory metaphysics. Bundle-theory, in one way or another, reduces the appearance of selfhood to a real stream of metaphysically individuated psychophysical events. However, I tried to defend other possibilities for the Buddhist philosopher by spinning a sort of mash-up of contemporary No-Self theories of mind and selfhood with Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysics. The latter 
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believes that the concept of self erroneously appears over the interplay of real atomic psychophysical phenomena, and I claimed that, nuanced in the right way, we might develop an ethics of otherness that builds responsibility for others out of a revision of self-regarding and forward-looking concerns. I nuanced this by appropriating basic elements from the well-developed post-modern discussion of 
“otherness.” The idea was that even at the core of our most personal and egocentric 
concerns, we experience responsibility toward an “other” that we ourselves are (in an attenuated sense). Nevertheless, both Bundle-theories and Abhidharma metaphysics have practical weaknesses. For example, even if we can individuate streams of consciousness by appeal to either a physical body, or a collection of psychophysical phenomena forged through unique dependency relations (in the case of Abhidharma metaphysics and Parfitian Bundle-theories), the responsibility we have toward various dimensions and temporal stretches of this stream remain ambiguous at best, and grossly under-determined at worst. This motivated me to bring Madhyamaka irrealism into the mix. Madhyamaka can provide a more praxis-
driven gloss on the notion of “otherness,” because it eschews metaphysics altogether, while deconstructing realist and essentialist discourse. So in a sense it promotes conventionalist-pragmatic discourse that speaks directly to the field of practical relationships and convention-driven actions. Madhyamaka Buddhism adds 
two important possibilities to “solving” the problem of justifying altruism. First, Madhyamaka focuses on the lived experience of seeing our future and past selves as both the same and other. I made a case for how this works in Śāntideva's text. This 
“sameness” is not something metaphysically identical, nor is it grounded in a 
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physicalist commitment to enduring bodies; it is, rather, the capacity to appropriate (upādāna), or, more literally, “be fueled by” what is always experienced as other, and thus to feel a responsiveness, and consequently a responsibility toward what is other. This underlies our sense of unity (sameness) with otherness. We learn to 
relate to and “own” this otherness through appropriative identification. In this way, 
I’ve clearly stepped outside the post-modern, or, Levinasian discussion of otherness, 
because I’m actually trying to bridge the gap between sameness and otherness—something the extraordinary and irreducible “Other” in Levinas would never allow. However, in another sense, I’m in step with that conversation, because I’m trying to respect the inscrutability and distinctness of the other, by holding identification and distinction in a productive and yet never fully-resolved tension. What I wanted to add to this picture is that appropriative identification does not entail that when I consider this future surrogate, and believe that it is other than me now, I completely 
overcome the sense of separateness and distance in a blissful “oneness.” The argument of chapter 3 sees this appropriative identification—this collapsing of the gap between self and other—as one forged through an ethical commitment to caring for the other (who is our future-surrogate) as one’s own, and caring for the other as one worthy to be cared for. This means that distinctness and sameness must be gripped in a productive tension that is never fully resolved. So caring about oneself is instructive in caring about the other. This would do some contemporary justice to the Buddhist connection between no-selfhood and ethics.    The second facet Madhyamaka brings to the table is that not committing to any real base of individuation (see chapter 2), and endorsing deconstruction in the 
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practical way I developed in chapter 3, helps unravel a quite natural view that often impedes us from acting beyond our own egoistic inclinations: it deconstructs the self/other dichotomy, and shows us that no knock-down metaphysical reasons prevent us from acting altruistically, and no knock-down metaphysical reasons ultimately support the view that altruistic reasons are less fundamental than egocentric concerns. Madhyamaka can do this because it is not commited to either a physicalist base of individuation (a real and metaphysically distinct body), nor is it commited to real ownership, since it eschews the belief that any sort of intrinsically existing phenomena constitutes a metaphysically distinct stream (saṅtāna).20 
According to this view, “mineness” is a conceptual fabrication built out of appropriation, which then attempts to ground this concept in deep metaphysical structures. Thus, while no knock-down arguments prove that we must take the other into ethical consideration, the minimalist and anti-metaphysical approach of Madhyamaka helps tear down the barriers between self and other that seem to motivate the natural inclination toward egoism. To this point, I argued that no metaphysical barriers prevent us from being altruistically concerned with all suffering. Thus, Madhyamaka clears a space for far-reaching altruistic concern by undermining some of the usual appeals that motivate egoism. By embracing 
“otherness” in the way I nuanced it in chapter 3, we can argue that our actions are always-already responsive to what is “other.”   But there are several problems with this approach. First, this negative point is non-implicational. If I say that nothing prevents me from being unselfish, this does                                                       20 “The continuum of consciousness [saṅtāna], like a queue, and the combination of constituents [samudāya], like an army, are not real [mṛṣā—‘fiction’]” (BCA, 8:101).  
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not mean that anything necessarily motivates me to be altruistic. For example, I may claim that the flower does not smell bad, but this does not necessarily imply that it smells good (it may smell bland or neutral or like nothing at all to me). So the challenge is to show how not only the barriers come down, but also how a positive altruistic motivation can grip us and guide our actions in a way that reaches the power of an ethical command.  Second, I claimed that at the core of experience there is a sense of personal responsibility toward what is other, and that when we tear down the metaphysical barrier between self and other, and see all action extending out toward what is “not 
me” (and, “me” in an attenuated and appropriative sense) our sense of responsibility can mature and cast itself wide enough to conceptually encompass everyone. These far-reaching considerations resonate with the agent-neutral sensibility informing utilitarianism. But here’s the problem with this. While I can view myself as other in the way I described in chapter 3, this implies that either: (a) I maintain a robust personal bond with this other, or, (b) I experience depersonalization. The latter means that I lose my bond with this other, and thus it remains mysterious why I experience any responsibility. So I have overplayed my hand by conflating 
“responsiveness” and “responsibility,” especially when the later term carries a normative-ethical weight that the former does not. However, if I maintain a personal bond as stated in (a), I can argue that this “other” is never fully other. Or, put another way, there is a difference in the bond I have with my surrogate and those thin bonds I have with strangers and acquaintances that surround me now. So, 
there’s still the possibility that a metaphysical ground for ethically privileging some 
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relationships over others, like the one I have with my surrogate-self, remains intact. One may argue further that the best explanation for the sense of responsibility I have for my surrogate-heir lies in identifying with this other. If I fully identify with this future person as myself rather than as a surrogate, then I have an ordinary, self-regarding and prudential concern. Yes, things are attenuated, because I may not believe that deep metaphysical bonds connect me to this future person. However, something (conventional?) still makes this person especially relevant to me-now in a way that it does not with any other person. Granted, my relationship to this future person is also thin and abstract, but a good reason for caring about this future person is that he is, practically speaking, me. While I do, paradoxically, identify with and yet distance myself from this other-me, I can simply view this distance as a temporal issue. For example, an endurantist about time—someone who believes that all time is dimensionally present—may embrace a four-dimensional view of time, which is par for the course in Einstein’s Relativity. Thus, the endurantist may claim that the temporal distance between me-now and future-me does not mean that future-me is metaphysically distinct from me-now. The properties of future-me, like my receding hair-line and my growing tummy, are temporal parts of the whole of me, and future-me is only thinly related to me-now from the vantage point of the spotlight shining on this part of the block universe, the part I call, “now.” So, I have not really treated myself as metaphysically other. Future-me is only a temporally distinct but metaphysically non-distinct version of me. Therefore, I contest that the Buddhist-hybrid picture I developed in chapter 3 ultimately fails to cogently explain 
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how I take up another’s cause as my own, and how I come to view and feel this action as an ethical requirement.   However, the one element I’d like to preserve from chapter 3 is the claim that when all things go well, responsibility towards others resonates at the core of our lived experience. I do not believe we learn to care about others from scratch. However, barring congenital psychopathy, and sociopathology developed out of early childhood trauma, we do learn how to extend our narrow frame of other-regarding concerns (say, an infant’s focused concern for her caretaker) to encompass ever larger fields of fellow humans and non-human creatures. That is, we can learn to more widely generalize our inherent sense of concern and responsibility to others, particularly when we recognize that we are imbued—in adopting values and meaningful goals—by a network of interdependent others.   Thus, I want to argue the following. The No-Self views of the Buddhists I’ve drawn from do not adequately account for what we mean by “selves.” Herein lies the ethical problem. I believe that a more appealing model of what constitutes selfhood is ineluctably bound up with normative phenomena that makes better sense of the normative grip altruistic actions can hold over us. Obviously, then, I believe that altruistic action often does have normative grip. But altruism can also be viewed as supererogation. Phenomenologically speaking, we can say that altruism exercises our unique capacity to feel “whole” and “full” enough to give beyond what might be socially required of us. So we can think altruism in terms of ethical duty, and we can think altruism in terms of moral psychology—compassion and identification—and, 
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finally, we can think altruism in terms of supererogation.21 Another possibility lies in thinking altruism out of metaphysics, a point I will devote a section to by 
assessing the role of compassion in the Mahāyāna-Vijñānavāda (or citamātra) school of Buddhist idealism—a school I have not treated yet in this work—specifically, the work of the Buddhist scholastic, Dharmakīrti, and the critique of his school by the Kashmiri Advaita-Śaivist, Abhinavagupta. For the latter, altruism is made possible by a monistic metaphysics and soteriology of recognition and identification with the universal self. This self is an infinitely creative energy that emanates into an individuated reality. Abhinavagupta and his lineage refer to this 
as, “Śiva.” Although capable of individuation, the self remains ultimately whole, and inherently imbued with will (icchā) and cognition that is self-manifesting (svaprakāśa) and self-conscious (svasaṃvedana). Full recognition of the empirical self as the universal self presumably reveals the inherent “bliss” (ānanda) and 
“fullness” (pūrṇatva) that also characterizes the playful creativity of this dynamic and self-manifesting force. This recognition generates altruistic concern for the other. While the Śaivists believe that full self-recognition (identification with the universal self) transcends the ethical domain of “duty” (dharma) and “negligence of 
duty” (adharma), the enlightened Śaivic sage still is motivated to devote his work and energy to others without any ulterior, self-regarding motivations. In other words, he engages philosophy and rational theology solely for the sake of helping others achieve recognition of their identity in the universal self. While the                                                       21 These are conceptual possibilities, and in forthcoming work, I will more thoroughly distinguish the altruistic act from things like favors and acts of kindness, 
of which “gift-giving” may be one. The latter do not bear the ethical weight that altruism does.  
 219 
enlightened, ultimate perspective may transcend many conventional ethical standards, the will remains operative (indeed, it is a fundamental aspect of the universal self). In this extraordinary state, the will is directed toward helping others, because the philosopher-sage who has secured identification with Śiva is “complete” 
or “full,” and thus not driven by self-regarding desires associated with an embodied and historical existence that is radically individuated. At this level, egoism is simply empty of meaning.22 But the main upshot that I am introducing is this: clarifying (or re-cognizing) this union with general selfhood provides us with a metaphysics that makes sense of how we can be compelled and compassionately motivated through 
empathic channels to behave altruistically. The idea here is that we are not metaphysically cut off from one another, and our emotional connectedness is not just a matter of thoughtful inference.   I will draw from Abhinavagupta’s metaphysical account of selfhood to develop the metaphysics of aspectual, mereological holism, which I believe can provide a promising account of the felt experience of obligation (and altruistic motivation) that comes with recognizing oneself in terms of a larger and dynamic whole. As far as metaphysics goes, there are important concepts the Śaivite introduces that fill motivational and epistemic gaps in the Buddhist and naïve realist accounts. To best develop this view, I’ll need to assess its foil (pūrvapakṣa), that is,                                                       22 See Isabelle Ratié, “Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijñā 
Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 37, Issue 4, 2009: 349-366. In 
reference to Abhinava’s interpretation of Utpaladeva, she writes: “Because the essence of consciousness is a subtle dynamism of which will or desire (icchā) is the first manifestation, the subject who escapes the bondage of individuality does not cease to have any will; but his will is exclusively turned toward others—it cannot be selfish, given the completeness or the fullness (pūrṇatva) that the liberated subject has acquired by recovering a full awareness of himself” (355). 
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the idealism and momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda) views endorsed by Dharmakīrti. By “momentariness,” I am referring to the belief that reality is cinematically made up of self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances, or, property-tropes. These property-tropes, according to Dharmakīrti, underlie the illusion of continuity.   Again, the challenge is to show how not only the barriers between self and other come down, but also how a positive altruistic motivation can grip us and guide our actions in a way that reaches the power of a felt, ethical command. I want to address the challenge in two directions. The first, I’ve already dealt with: the normative self emerges in a relational social-space, and thereby, integrates its practical identity through its higher-order, “participant” volitions. The second and more robust solution requires a metaphysical account, where as one aspect, the self remains individuated and distinct, but under another aspect, the self shares in a more general experience of selfhood. So, in the next section, I will assess 
Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics and Abhinavagupta’s critical engagement with them.  
4.6 Momentariness and the Problem of Other Persons in Dharmakīrti: an 
Advaita-Śaivite Response  How am I able to distinguish a non-sentient object from a conscious subject (pramātṛ)? I can reasonably infer that creatures exhibiting the same types of publicly observable traits as I do possess consciousness, and those with whom I can converse probably have first-person experiences and a sense of self. Stones and laptops do not look like me, nor do they behave like me. And most living things, like trees and weeds, do not exhibit agency; so they probably do not experience 
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anything. But what does it mean to “exhibit agency?” Perhaps “agency” refers to the self-directed action of complex language-users making various commitments and promises within a conditioned, causal order. Or, it may be enough to call someone an agent who exhibits characteristic behaviors that, like my dog’s behaviors, reveal some sense of flexible responsiveness, emotional aptitude, and sensory-motor integration. How, then, do I perceive someone’s agency?  As a start to answering some of these big questions, I begin with a manifest fact: stones, laptops, trees, and dogs do not appear to be extensions of my own mind. Even in a simulated or dream world, I view myself as one among many external objects, which means that I inherently employ a general concept of otherness (paratva). Otherness shows up in my experience of a distinct object, a mere “it.” But otherness also shows up in my experience of other conscious beings, which I designate with personal pronouns.   I also experience the immediate presence of perceptual objects, and by that, I mean everyday things like desks and mounting piles of paperwork. While I can attest for this immediate experience of presence in my own case, I cannot do so for you. As Wittgenstein humorously put things, I might believe that I have a beetle in my own box (or a private and conscious experience in my own head), but I can only tenuously infer that another body houses or generates private experiences. What’s worse, I cannot be sure that conscious experience necessarily requires a body at all, especially since my body can sometimes show up as just another object in a way that my occurrent, first-person experience cannot. While one thought may become part of the content of another thought—as in the case of deliberation and memory—
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the experience of presence, itself, is not the sort of thing that is publicly observable. Nor, do I believe, is it introspectively observable; “presence” is already in play from the moment I turn my attention inward. Therefore, consciousness does not show up as a thing among other observable things. It’s not as though I can definitively claim that my wife is conscious in the morning just because her eyes open. Still, I see her eyes open, and I know that she is conscious. This seems to me a small miracle!  Unconvinced that consciousness and subjectivity emerge from something purely inert, and unconvinced that it makes sense to believe that objects exist outside the minds that cognize them, Buddhist-idealists (Vijñānavādins) advanced a host of arguments attacking external-world realism and materialism. Their basic argument is that any X and Y that are invariably concomitant cannot be metaphysically distinct. An object of consciousness cannot be viewed as an independent object outside of some sensory experience of that object: wherever there is an experience of the harvest moon, the conscious experience always accompanies the perceptual object. These Buddhists capitalize on the fact that it makes little sense to say that there can be “something out there” that we are unable to perceive under any sensory contexts or modalities, which strict independence between objects and subjects would logically, although not necessarily materially, seem to entail. Cogent or not, I do not intend to elucidate the host of idealist arguments advanced by various citamātra, or, “mind-only” Buddhist philosophers. Instead, I wish to focus on the shape the problem of otherness takes within the framework of Buddhist idealism. At stake for the Mahāyāna Buddhist, among other things, is the very coherence of compassion and altruism: without a coherent 
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account of otherness, Buddhists struggle to provide a compelling account of other-centric motivations.   The representationalist model of perception that Sautrāntika Buddhists23 advanced left a gap for idealist arguments of the Yogācāra, Mind-Only and 
Vijñānavāda schools.24 For the Sautrāntika, we do not directly see the objects that support our perceptions. All perception is mediated. Along with the idealists, they believe that an intentional object of consciousness is the product of that very consciousness. Thus, we are only conversant with our ideas of objects, and we must 
infer an external support (ālambana) for these representations. Still, Sautrāntikas remain realists about external objects. This school posits the existence of external-world objects through inference (bāhyārthānumeyavāda). But if this inference is 
shown to be weak, then we’re left with only the objects of our own consciousness, a point that drives all species of idealism. The Sautrāntika philosophers argue that 
Vijñānavāda idealism is incoherent, because our perceptions represent multiple and qualitatively diverse objects. However, according to these same philosophers, consciousness is not multiple and qualitatively diverse, but simply a singular capacity to illuminate and represent (or take the mold of) what is diverse: the light is singular, but the objects that shine under its illumination are diverse. Thus, consciousness and the objects of consciousness cannot be equivalent since they bear distinct essential properties.    
                                                      23 This refers to the school of “sūtra followers,” or, Abhidharma-Buddhist metaphysicians. 24 For the sake of simplicity, I conflate the various strands of these idealist schools.  
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 The idealist can respond that “the awakening of residual traces” (vāsanāprabodha) from past lives, or, beginningless streams of consciousness, can account for the variety of perceptions. These traces are somehow “reawakened” in the flow of insulated and singular cognitions. We do not need to appeal to external objects, because the mind-stream that accounts for the image of diverse things bears residual traces of experiences, or, “seeds” (bīja) by which it generates an on-going experience of diversity. Poetically, we can say that consciousness dresses its experience in a perfume (vāsanā) of residual traces (vāsanā). For the Buddhist-idealist, the belief that objects are external to the mind is ultimately false, and we see this layered into the very definition of a “vāsanā,” by the fact that the term may also designate false perceptions and images.   Now, as realists about the external world, we can try to corner the idealist by asking what accounts for the variety of vāsanās. The idealist seems to regressively push the problem back: diversity, itself, is the very thing that needs to be explained. Nevertheless, for the Vijñānavādin, the stream over which we erroneously develop the belief in an enduring self is not a psychophysical stream. The saṅtāna (the streaming of isolated, but associated cognitions that we erroneously reify) is nothing but a series of momentary cognitions, or, ephemeral point-instances of consciousness. These give rise to new cognitions in a cinematic emergence of conscious moments. In contemporary metaphysics, we would call these property-tropes, or, instances of properties unbounded by an underlying or continuous 
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substance. Contemporary Stage-theory metaphysics25 also parallels this by advancing the view that reality unfolds cinematically and episodically rather than continuously.26 For Dharmakīrti and the Buddhists, this sort of metaphysics is 
consistent with the Buddha’s message that there is no underlying self-substance (ātman), and everything is, quite literally, impermanent (anitya). The subject (pramātṛ) is not an enduring metaphysical entity, but a conceptual error (vikalpa) of the imagination that arises out of these ephemeral cognitions. For Dharmakīrti, all cognitions are self-reflexively aware (svasaṃvedana), and this partly explains how we develop the false belief that a self endures through multiple cognitions.27 Cognizing X also means at the same time cognizing the cognition of X. The immersive first-person cognition that ensues retains the seed-like trace of its ephemeral predecessor, but the X that it sees is not really separate from the self-generating and self-reflexive point-instance. As Ratié puts it, for the Vijñānavādin, “the objects perceived by the subject have no existence outside of the cognitive series, objectivity is nothing but a cognitive event in which consciousness presents itself as external.”28 The world is a pure externalization of the mind, which is impermanent, something dying and being re-born in self-manifesting and ephemeral point-instances. So, my 
                                                      25 See Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 26 For Stage-theorists like Hawley, this view can solve various identity problems we encounter in thought experiments like the Ship of Theseus.  27 On svaprakāśa (self-luminosity) and svasaṃvedana (reflexive, self-consciousness), 
see Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu I: 10: sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam: “All cognitions and all mental phenomena are self-conscious.” Cited in manuscript of 
Dharmottara’s commentary, Nyāyabinduṭīka (see bibliography), cited in Ratié, 321.  28 Ratié, Otherness, 320.   
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seeing anything is just an ephemeral cognition that sees itself externalized as a distinct object while seeing that very seeing.   But if this is true, then the Buddhist must show how other selves show up to a self-illuminated and self-manifesting episode of consciousness. Even if the Buddhist bites the bullet and accepts solipsism, he fairs no better in making sense of the experience, or, sense of an external subject. Dharmakīrti’s endorsement of 
svasaṃvedana seems to dig him into this hole. A self-manifested cognition cannot be grasped by another cognition, because it would cease to be self-manifested, and become a mere object for another. However, the appearance of a subject who has self-illuminating cognitions cannot just show up as a mere object for the obvious reason that we lose the subjectivity of the subject; we reify and objectify the self-subject that was allegedly perceived. So by Dharmakīrti’s metaphysics, I cannot account for your immediate presence of experience, that is, your sense of selfhood, because I cannot come into direct contact with you.29   This is potentially damning to his larger project, because the ethics of compassion and altruism must preserve the integrity of other persons. But perhaps this is only a superficial problem. We might explain being motivated by another’s suffering through indirect apprehension of their pain. However, admitting that something exists externally to consciousness—like other streaming minds that project a reality—defeats the very premise of Buddhist idealism, namely, that we                                                       29 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “Because cognition has this self-manifesting power as its characteristic, no given cognition can be manifested or grasped by another cognition, otherwise it would cease to be a cognition and become a mere object of cognition, which means that I can never take as objects of my consciousness 
someone else’s cognitions.”  
 227 
cannot ultimately distinguish between the subject who is conscious and the object that only appears to exist externally to that consciousness. Why it should be different with respect to the otherness of other subjects, even if they are reduced to mere streams of associated and isolated cognitions, is not clear. The bigger problem that arises is that not being able to distinguish other streaming minds from this streaming mind that I erroneously call “myself” undermines my capacity to distinguish minds from mere objects. At stake is my capacity to make sense of even 
a general notion of “otherness,” since the boundary between mind and intentional object collapses altogether.30 Thus, the logic of this form of idealism threatens to undermine any normative grip that commands the Buddhist to cultivate impartial compassion for all sentient and suffering creatures. Duties notwithstanding, this brand of metaphysics also destabilizes the motivational rationality of the felt 
concern for another’s pain.   As a solution, Dharmakīrti bites the bullet on directly knowing other minds. He believes that we simply infer their existence, and so, we never directly know others.31 The best that we can derive is a general concept of otherness. In claiming 
this, Dharmakīrti puts his finger on an enduring problem. There is no instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) that provides us with direct perception (pratyakṣa) of other 
                                                      30 Ratiér, Otherness, 321: “The Vijñānavādin fails to account for otherness because the others [who are other persons] cannot be ontologically distinguished from mere 
objects.”  31 Ratiér, Otherness, 324, who cites Stcherbastsky’s translation of Dharmakīrti’s 
Santānāntarasiddhi (“Proof of the Existent-Streams of Others”), sūtra 72: “General concept [of other mind] is not identical with other mind itself. If it were so, we 
would have cognized the form of other mind as clearly as that of our own.”  
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selves. The best that we have at our disposal is inference.32 The ethical problem that I see here is that your need may become a concern for my altruistic sensibility, but I cannot ultimately establish its authorship (so long as the inference proves tenuous): I cannot know how (and if) you motivate me. I cannot know how the purported experiences of your mind have any direct bearing on my motivations, nor can I know how it makes sense to feel that your well-being is intrinsically valuable. We see a similar problem in epistemological skepticism: if I cannot provide a clear and unwavering account of how I acquired my belief (in the “right way”) a wedge is left open for skepticism.33  The argument from inference does not seem to work in Dharmakīrti’s brand 
of idealism, and, even worse, it leaves Dharmakīrti unable to account for otherness.34 My goal is to show how the monistic-idealism of Abhinavagupta provides a cogent critique of the inference-strategy, while offering a new avenue for                                                       
32 Buddhist epistemology since Dharmakīrti (and his predecessor, Digṅaga) only accepts two pramāṇas (knowledge-producing instruments): direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Of the latter, there are inferences made from causal associations (kārya-hetu), where X is seen to be the cause of Y appearing (e.g., fire being the cause of smoke arising), and svabhāva-hetu, where the nature of X, once clarified, includes Y (something like an analytic claim). A valid inference must have, among other things, a statement of invariable concomitance, where X is found to follow Y, and where the contraposition (vyaterika) also holds: ~X is found to follow from ~Y. For an excellent analysis of Dharmakīrtian inference and general problems in Indian logic, see: B.K. Matilal, The Character of Indian Logic (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998): chapter 5.  33 This, of course, lies at the heart of naturalized epistemology, which emerges as an 
answer to the “justified, true belief” account of knowledge that Gettier problems destabilize.   34 Ratié has provided a detailed and cogent argument addressing that point through 
her analysis of the Sautrāntika-Buddhist “externalists,” and Abhinavagupta’s 
commentaries on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā and its auto-commentaries. See, fn. 2 above.   
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“reading other’s emotions.”35 This new avenue fills what I believe is a basic epistemological and motivational gap in the purely normative account.  
4.7.1 The Problem of Inferring Other Minds, and the Possibility of Sharing a 
World  Dharmakīrti’s inference works like this. He experiences the action of speech to be invariably concomitant (vyāpta) with a desire that causes him to say or have 
the thought, “I want to speak.” This concomitance is of the kārya-hetu variety. In 
other words, Dharmakīrti believes that the desire enters into the causal history of the speech-act (or propositional thought); so, whenever the desire is absent, the propositional thought that can issue in speech is also absent. This insight can now serve as a generalizable premise in an inference. Devadatta speaks. Devadatta does not suffer from Tourette syndrome. Where there’s an absence of desire (or some relevant mental state), there’s an absence of speech, and where there’s an absence 
of a thought that can issue in speech, there’s an absence of desire (or whatever relevant mental state). Thus, Devadatta desires to speak. Unlike a stone or a lap-top, Devadatta is a mental stream.   But how does Dharmakīrti know that Devadatta is not just another product of his own mental stream? Well, that’s easy. He never experiences the relevant 
mental state that directly motivates Devadatta to say, “Hey, it’s me…Devadatta, and I want to be heard!” However, when Dharmakīrti speaks, he does experience the                                                       35Arindam Chakrabarti crafts much of this strategy. However, he does not directly connect this to the weakness of a purely normative account of altruistic reasons and 
selfhood. See Chakrabarti, “How Do We Read Others’ Feelings?  Strawson and 
Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakirti, Ratnakīrti and Abhinavagupta” in Comparative 
Philosophy Without Borders (Bloomsbury Academic Publishers, 2015), Chapter 5.   
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relevant mental state underwriting his own thought. Furthermore, he cannot make sense of that mental state unless it is directed toward an audience of whom he wishes to be heard. This is the final premise supporting the inference that Devadatta is another stream (santānāntara). Dharmakīrti hears Devadatta speak, and part of 
Dharmakīrti’s own speech-act includes wanting to communicate and be heard by 
others when he speaks. This provides him with a concept of otherness, while Devadatta speaking provides him with a concept of other mental streams. Consequently, we develop a general concept of “otherness,” without ever directly perceiving the fact that other subjects exist. This also means that we never really directly share feelings—we can infer them, but they can never directly motivate us.   However, this line of thinking is exactly where Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a box” rears its head. The relationship between my own motivating mental state and a speech-form (or propositional thought) takes universal scope only when I assume in 
advance that the utterances of an allegedly distinct stream are not random occurrences. I never confuse Siri on my cellphone for a breathing, thinking, and conscious assistant. “She” is always only an “it” to me, and I never have to worry about giving it Christmas bonuses. If I have not established in advance that you have 
a “mental beetle” in your head, then I cannot assume that what I’ve introspectively discovered about myself applies to anyone but myself.   Abhinavagupta’s critique of the argument is that it both undermines our ability to make sense of our experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability to make sense of otherness as a well-formed concept. The problem lies in 
Dharmakīrti’s inference. Dharmakīrti believes he has secured a premise articulating 
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universal concomitance: whenever he utters something, he has some desire to utter something (barring Tourette Syndrome). Moreover, his not uttering something is explained by a desire not to utter something (even in cases where he has conflicting desires—like when he bites his tongue and chooses to withhold an utterance out of prudence). He hears Devadatta utter something. So he infers that Devadatta must have a desire as well, and this proves that Devadatta has a mind.   Dharmakīrti cannot help himself to the universal premise he provides. Just because I know in my own case that my utterances are underwritten by a desire to speak, which introspectively reveals that I am immediately aware of my own subjectivity, I cannot assume that such a relation holds between Devadatta, because I cannot publicly observe his desire without begging the question that he’s the type of entity that has desires in the first place. The problem here is that determining this is precisely what was at stake in the first place. So either I know in advance that Devadatta has a mind, thus begging the question, or I cannot help myself to the inference, thereby leaving me without the kernel of knowledge I had hoped to glean. I am hopelessly unable to prove the existence of another self. The critique, then, is 
that Dharmakīrti’s argument both undermines our ability to make sense of our experience of other selves, and it undermines our ability to make sense of otherness as a well-formed concept.  Dharmakīrti responds by appealing to the communicatory aspect of language. I do not just say things because I feel like saying things. I also want to be heard, and more importantly, this presupposes my capacity to communicate with others. My speech-act is always grounded in the background presupposition that I 
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am communicating to an audience who can potentially understand me. In this way, I 
can become the object for another’s thought-stream. This allows us to revise our belief in distinct selves (through independent arguments to that effect), while also explaining how we form the view that we are (relatively) distinct individuals. Presupposing an audience to whom one wishes to communicate is a background assumption underlying language-use. Thus, Dharmakīrti does not beg the question; he simply uncovers the ultimately erroneous appearances that make sense of our experience. This is the cherished outcome of any useful revision.   But the deepest problem is that Dharmakīrti maintains both his momentariness and no-self claims along with his idealism. Subjects and objects are not ultimately distinct. There are no selves to distinguish one mental stream from another. So the only distinction available rests in the content of the cognitions themselves. This means that Devadatta and I have numerically and qualitatively distinct cognitions. Potentially, then, the appearance to me of a vast ocean is only a smear of grey paint for Devadatta. Nevermind sharing emotions—nothing determines how we share any perceptual objects! The best that Dharmakīrti might supply here is a sort of Occasionalism. Cognitions provide an occasion for similar, but ultimately distinct, views of reality. Somehow, we share a collective illusion that supports conventional reality.  
4.7.2 Mereological Holism and Other Minds: A Metaphysical Solution to the 
Problem of Unity in Diversity (Bhedābheda) 
 Before diving into Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness, I 
would like to sketch a metaphysics that both parallels the Śaivite system, and 
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collapses the numerical distinction that Sidgwick viewed to be an ethically intractable problem. The problem, as Sidgwick saw it, is that real numerical distinction between persons provides one with irreducibly egocentric reasons for action. This, of course, generates the question as to what sorts of reasons have authority—either generally speaking, or in particular contexts. But I believe that we can bridge the divide between egoistic and altruistic reasons by revising our commonsense metaphysics. I might say that with the passing of a loved one, some part of me dies. Can I so easily say the same when I hear of the tragic loss of 




Counting Problems with Parts & Wholes: Aspects vs. Properties  The Buddhist philosopher will argue that talk of either psychophysical or 
purely mental “streams” (saṅtāna) is just reification. More strictly put, we should describe the situation as a “stream-ing.” Moreover, even if we eschew the momentariness thesis, we can claim that the various dharmas (elements) that make up an object or a person are, strictly speaking, independent parts operating in concert. Any sort of whole that we posit is simply a product of a pragmatically useful, but conceptual fabrication. The chariot is not a whole above and beyond the parts out of which it is constructed. We are tempted to introduce such a notion in order to explain the dynamic and fluid unity that allows us to count composite objects. But believing that a “whole-chariot” really exists above the chariot-parts proves to be explanatorily bankrupt (so the Buddhist argues). If the chariot were to collide into a tree and find itself strewn into parts all over the road, we would not claim that the chariot exists in several locations at once. All we have are parts that were once related in various ways, and their hypostasized continuity is simply a matter of functionality. When the chariot still functions, but loses one of its wheels, we can speak of the whole chariot missing a part. Buddhists provide a number of arguments to this effect. For example, if the whole were something over and above the parts-in-relation, we could ask where this whole is located. Is it located in every part? If so, then the whole would be multiple. But the whole is distinguished from its parts by being singular. How can it be both one and many at the same time? Furthermore, if we insisted that the whole exists in its parts, we would have to believe that part of the chariot exists in the reins, in the carriage, and in the wheels, 
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etc. In other words, the whole is distributed throughout its parts. But this means the chariot-whole can be divided into “whole-parts” that are in the various chariot-parts that make up the chariot. Some part of the whole is in the reins, and some part is in the wheels, etc.36 But this introduces new parts, and the problem of whether such parts are identical with, imbued by, or distinct from some underlying whole would regressively reintroduce itself. Moreover, it would not explain what it was supposed to explain, namely, how these parts come together to constitute a whole.37 Finally, this generates a counting problem. Say the chariot was composed of 15 parts. Do we have 15 or 16 objects, the parts-in-relation as well as the whole chariot? Parsimony dictates that we keep the count at 15.  On the other hand, parsimony might dictate keeping the count at 1 (if we really go down the rabbit hole of counting constitutive parts, we’d have a nearly infinite count of electrons, protons, quarks, and parts within parts—something the work of context-sensitive sortals can help us avoid by keeping us tethered to medium-sized objects). So let’s just say we have a single object, a chariot. But then how do things add up when the chariot has a single, dented wheel? In one sense, we can say that the chariot is dented. In another sense, we can say that the front-left wheel is dented, but the other three wheels are not. Taken as a real composite, the chariot is dented. But viewed in terms of only parts, the front-left wheel is dented. Does this mean that a composite is a useful, but ultimately hypostasized entity? Can                                                       36 For a thorough, analytic account of mereological reductionism in Buddhist 
metaphysics, and Vasubandhu’s attack against the Nyāya belief in real wholes and real substances, see Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007), chapter 6, cf. 105-113.   37 Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 109.  
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we do justice to the idea that there are real composites, and they are not simply conceptual fabrications woven over individual items?   On that measure, Nyāya philosophy appeals to a theory of substances and universals. So, a substance (say, tea) inheres in the atoms of which it is composed. Universals, like redness, inhere in the ruby ring and in the red paint. Naiyāyikas would further argue that a cloth is distinct from the threads of which it is composed, just as the universal quality, redness, is distinct from this particular red swath.38 Now if we were to accept such a robust metaphysics, then we would encounter familiar problems with positing the existence of real universals, and we would definitely add entities to a world that we may otherwise wish to pare down. A vast literature is devoted to this issue in both South Asian and Euro-American philosophy—so I do not intend to rehearse that enduring conversation. Instead, I would like to propose a view developed in Baxter.39 The idea here is that the chariot is exactly 15 things (in my simplified example), but at the same time, it is simply one chariot. The key point here is that if the chariot is genuinely one whole, then we have to devise a way to count the individuals making up that whole as numerically 
identical. Individuals cannot remain numerically distinct at the ultimate level, 
because then we would remain hampered by the “one versus many” argument (a                                                       38 Ibid, 110: Siderits reconstructs from the classic, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 
Vasubandhu’s Buddhist attack against the Nyāya view: “Suppose there is a piece of cloth on the floor, but I can only see a single thread of its fringe. We would not say that I then see the cloth. Why not? If it is because I am seeing just one part of the cloth, then the cloth as a whole is not in that thread. To see the cloth I must see more than just one thread. And if it is a large piece of cloth, I may never see all the threads 
at one time…but if I never see the cloth as a whole, then it is something that is put 
together by the mind, not something existing in reality.”  39 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 377. 
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favorite of Buddhist philosophers). Wholes would become mere playthings of the mind.    So how do we defend such a view? Like the Advaita Vedāntin, we can claim that distinction is ultimately illusory (māyā). Wholes are not reducible to parts-in-relation, because, in a Bradlyean twist, relations themselves prove illusory. There is simply an inexpressible whole (Brahman as nirguṇa: “without qualities”), out of which beginningless illusion generates the mistaken belief in pluralism. Some obvious problems plague this view (for example, the problem of explaining, without endorsing dualism, how a single block essence carves out a space of “beginningless 
illusion,” or, māyā within its omnipresent singularity). So let me illustrate another possibility.   Consider Leibniz’s Law. Ted is a handsome father and husband. Ted is also a media tycoon. These are various aspects through which Ted exists. As a loving husband, viewing women as his equals, Ted can object to one of his media outlets airing the Howard Stern show (a depraved show that objectifies women and applauds a multitude of lewd behaviors and outlandish pranks). But as a CEO, for some normatively relevant reason, he can give the green-light on airing the show. This is not a contradiction (although it generates an extreme tension with respect to his personal ethical loyalties and the normative requirements expected of him under the adoption of different social roles). However, when Ted is the CEO of a media empire on January 20th, 1995, then a bald Ted and a long-haired CEO of that empire on January 20th, 1995 would be a contradiction. Under all aspects of Ted considered in that moment, he will have baldness; so it’s a contradiction to say that 
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he is bald under all aspects in that moment, but not bald under the aspect of being a CEO. Baldness is a quality, or, property he bears whether he’s a father, a board-member, or a devout Catholic. So one individual cannot possess and not-possess some property under all aspects. But the same individual can certainly manifest in aspectually complex ways. To say that Ted under one aspect is identical to a composite whole, and under another aspect, is individuated as a particular entity is not to say that he has a certain quality and lacks a certain quality under all aspects of his current existence. This aspectual distinction is akin to saying that Ted is both a morally conservative husband, and a Media tycoon who gives the green-light to a morally reckless show. From one aspect, Ted is an individual; and from a different aspect, Ted is the whole (non-individual). These are not contradictory properties, but only different aspects. We can loosely think of this in terms of time and four-dimensional metaphysics. My thin, unwrinkled self is identical to my plump, wrinkled self, because I am one whole stretched out over time. Granted, in the current spotlight of the present, I cannot be both wrinkled and unwrinkled. But under the aspect of this individual slice, and under the aspect of time taken as a whole block, I can manifest what would be contradictory properties at any single instance. This means that one temporal slice of me has one quality, while another slice has another quality. This is no more contradictory than saying that the road is both straight and curved—one stretch is straight, while another stretch is curved under the aspect of a single, whole road. Likewise, the individual threads of the cloth are whole, and therefore, numerically identical, but under a different aspect, one burnt section of the fringe is black, while another non-burnt section retains its lush, 
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pomegranate-red hue. There is no illusion involved here. We can view reality as multivalent, and therefore, describable under different aspects of its manifestation.40   This view affords us a different angle into the problem of “the one vs. the 
many.” We do not have to claim that the whole is something “above and beyond” the parts in which it inheres. The whole is simply whole (a fitting tautology), and yet it manifests under the aspect of individuation and numerical distinction. We can count reality in two distinct ways. Likewise, we can count the chariot in two distinct ways. When we count it as one thing, then a dent in its wheel means that the chariot is 
dented. When I’m rear-ended, I can say that my bumper is dented—but not my hood—and that’s important when I need to locate the damage on my vehicle. But I can just as easily call my insurance agent and file a claim for my “dented car.”   Let me further elucidate, through an example drawn from classical-modern empiricism,41 the distinction between aspectual complexity and qualitative diversity. Empiricists in Hume’s era might have claimed that it makes sense to talk about a simple, partless property like a red-simple. Consider a red-simple and a blue-simple. The red is similar to the blue in being simple, but it is dissimilar in being a red-simple rather than a blue-simple. So this hypothesized simple, which, 
qua simplicity, is a partless entity, nevertheless shows complexity. It does not have the contradictory properties of being similar and dissimilar. Rather, it manifests aspectual complexity.42 Likewise, reality does not have the distinct properties of                                                       40 Baxter, Altruism, Grief, and Identity, 376-383. 41 Baxter provides this example in Altruism, Grief, and Identity, at 379. 42 Ibid., 378. 
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being one and being many; instead, reality may be viewed as aspectually complex, and this is what I mean by “mereological holism.”  
Aspectual Complexity and the Ethics of Other Minds 
 The view I’ve adopted here does not succumb to the problems of simple monism. When a loved one passes away, my family does not have to hold a funeral for me and my dearly departed. In this way, things remain economically parsimonious for my family, and we do not proliferate entities beyond the pale of what commonsense would accept. Obviously, I can participate in the funeral without requiring my own funeral. However, I can also experience a metaphysical absence in my core. In some sense, I’ve been buried away with this dear soul. In this other sense, numerical distinction simply does not apply. This view allows us to do justice to calling a bad carton of eggs a single thing, while admitting that one broken egg in the carton entails only eleven good eggs.   Earlier, I claimed that an inference to the existence of other minds leaves us with an ethically relevant epistemological problem. I cannot know how your grief and suffering directly motivates me, nor if its value lies in anything other than my egocentrically present values. I might accept this fact, and simply believe that your grief only indirectly motivates me. But this can lead us to pernicious solipsism. Moreover, the motivated force of my action only indirectly includes your suffering. By this view, I can never really know how your “external” grief motivates me 
“internally.” However, with mereological holism, I can now bridge this gap by saying that your suffering is my suffering under the aspect of the whole. Any intrinsic worth my life has is just the intrinsic worth of sentient life as such. Under this view, 
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altruism may amount to recognition of unity that transcends the concerns of the delimited ego. I recognize myself as the whole, and my ingrained identification with my narrative self is temporarily elided. In other words, I do not project my ego over the whole (as in crude solipsism), but simply recognize pervading unity. Your grief is real, and it really motivates action (and sometimes it directly motivates my action), because grief and suffering are real and shareable as such. Sidgwick’s dilemma falls away under the holism of aspectual complexity. Nevertheless, the 
difference between Śāntideva’s ownerless strategy and mereological holism is pronounced. Without a self that underlies (and under an aspect, locates) suffering, and without a unifying thread that allows one to retain and genuinely respond to a flowing stream of passing experiences, altruism and other-regarding considerations remain empty.43 Moreover, experiencing selfhood as such means that the reflexive nature of consciousness is partly constitutive of what existing as self amounts to. 
While consciousness can be “for itself” (in the sense of being reflexively aware) it 
can be “for another” (in the ethically relevant sense of caring for another) when it sees itself as other. But nowhere in this process does the concept of selfhood just fall away. Ownerlessness refers to the ego-self and not the unifying thread of selfhood in general.                                                            43 Perhaps even Śāntideva, at least rhetorically, could not resist such a solution: “If you think that it is for the person who has the pain to guard against it, a pain in the 
foot is not of the hand, so why is the one protected by the other” (8:99 in Crosby and Skilton; at 96). For this to make sense, the hand and the foot must be identifiable as a single, suffering body. If we extend this to cover suffering creatures in general, 
then the egoist cannot claim that it is ultimately every individual’s own responsibility to cure their own pain. However, Śāntideva resists such a move, because he tows the Buddhist belief that unity and continuity—as well as the self—does not ultimately exist.  
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 While Occam might not have approved of such an inflated metaphysics, this view provides us with the distinct advantage of locating our shared world—replete with shared feelings, and shared joy and suffering—in a field that reverberates with motivating forces available to us all. For the naturalistic-minded person—and for the materialist—this may not be as extravagant as it sounds. A field that manifests as a particle in a collapsed wave-function allows us to speak of the probability of a photon showing up in an exact location, while also allowing us to speak of an amorphous wave that defies exact location: we can speak of a holistic phenomenon 
that manifests as both wave and particle. No “ghost in the machine” is necessarily required in this model (nor is it inconsistent with this model). I employ this very loose analogy only to emphasize that a physical description of holism—and thus, 
ultimately “ownerless” and yet delimited manifestations of matter—can similarly make sense of things like quantum entanglement that by another description (of real, metaphysically individuated entities, occupying exact locations) would have to 
allow information to travel faster than the speed of light. Perhaps my “ethical 
entanglement” with your feelings allow us to remain numerically distinct while ultimately whole. In the holism I am developing here, altruism would be an emergent phenomenon located in the toggle between my sense of delimitation, and my sense of direct connectedness to a larger whole that transcends the limits of the ego.       
4.8.1 Self and Other Minds…a Bridge to Motivated Altruism 
 I argued that viewing selfhood in terms of a normative, participant self helps ground altruistic reasons. Also, this view of self may provide steps for contextually 
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determining the authority of altruistic reasons over self-regarding reasons. Basically, when I believe that a context affords me the right to expect (and in this sense, demand) help, I cannot consistently claim that, all things equal, your occupying that position does not generate the same demand. In this way, the 
demand manifests as an “external” constraint, and not a mere product of my subjective desires: it emerges out of background prior-commitments that make communication possible. Just as I believe that my starving child is a reason for those in a position to help to give up some of their time, resources, or energy to help him, anyone else has the same legitimate reason that applies to me in spite of my immediate inclination to ignore their problem. It is altruistic when I recognize and act upon the legitimacy of the demand, without its legitimacy originating in a personal desire or an expectation that I directly benefit from it. Even when we view altruism as supererogation, this view has much to recommend it. On the applied-ethical side, we may not ethically chastise the soldier who does not leap on the landmine. We may not ethically scold the unsuspecting citizen, who, while waiting for a subway car, leaps onto the tracks with a train only dozens of meters away to save the life of a person who has unwittingly fallen on those same tracks. If that were the case, then we would have a whole subway station of morally reprehensible people, and our claim would seem to entail that everyone of able body ought to be a hero. The normative view only claims that reasonable demands emerging out of the background commitments that communication presupposes have normative grip without direct appeal to personal desires and self-regarding considerations. This shows how it can be reasonable to act on behalf of another without immediate 
 244 
concern for advancing one’s own agenda, and without concern for appeasing one’s own self-regarding wishes.    Still, my problem with this view is that it leaves motivators out of the story. 
While much of my argument seems to hinge on a strict distinction between “reason” 
(rational principle) and “motivation” (a holistic and emotive responsiveness that drives action), this sort of distinction shapes various strategies, and pre-determines various conversations and philosophical puzzles from the outset, puzzles that may otherwise fall away without such prior commitments determining the domain of discourse. The egoistic worldview thrives on just this sort of firm distinction. My believing that it is reasonable—or somehow required—that a stranger who lives thousands of miles away should assist my hurricane-ravaged family is precisely the issue of contention for the egoist. Certainly, if we accept in advance that this is a rational requirement written into the speech-acts that shape our social living, the claim would have some traction. But an egoist might not demand help from others (granted, he may want it, but we’re presumably not talking about only subjective desires or conative motivators at this level of normative analysis). He may believe that his demand is not legitimate, and that it ultimately lacks rational authority despite its emotive force. For example, he sees your new Tesla, and he wants it, but 
he’s under no illusion that his desire entails a legitimate demand; after all, desire alone (so the egoist argues) should not be confused for a principle of action. The egoist might argue that his desire to call out for help should never be confused for an authoritative principle. Likewise, your desiring help from the egoist needs some sort of principled grounding that legitimizes it. While that may be true, perha
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go too far to assume that a “principled grounding” arises from some purely cognitive domain that somehow needs to connect to a separate, motivating and conative domain. The larger problem that I believe underlies this contention is the view that rationality somehow conceptually exists beyond the pale of motivators. Unlike Kant, I would argue that emotive force and motivation is bound up with rational reasons—by that, I mean that without a proper emotional economy, rationality would have no bearing on our lives; and this is not just a contingent issue; rationality shows up experientially as felt and emotively charged reasons. Not only do I respect your inherent dignity, but I also feel your worth. I feel the worth of acting on principle, and that is part of experiencing my decision as a rational choice. Sometimes the principle shines so powerfully that it requires things of me at odds with my immediate inclinations, and I experience considerable cognitive and emotional tension. But I nevertheless feel the weight of its authority (and I don’t mean this trivially—its authority is communicated through an emotive and representational pathway that allows it to show up as a guiding value).   You might argue that, metaethically, this reduces moral values to conative forces, thus rendering talk of truth-values moot when it comes to moral judgments. 
But I’m suggesting that we explore the possibility of our capacity to really share—not merely infer—an emotional ground that dovetails into guiding values. The truth-value of the principle lies in a common ground of experience, which under one aspect shows up as a motivating, emotional force, and under another aspect, shows up as representational content, something like a demand or a commitment. We have something that is both belief and feeling. This view requires making sense of how 
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any such “common ground” exists. Can we directly share common feelings, or do we only indirectly infer them? The latter possibility is attractive when we view an embodied psychophysical organism as part of a closed system. This sort of biological 
computer would operate on inputs and “decision modules”—replete with decision-trees and evaluation functions that adjust themselves to perturbations in its nervous system. I am suggesting that this requires we view “sharing” as inferences that keep us one-step removed from the environment (and our fellow creatures) that afford 
“inputs” for the organic system. But just as in the case of a cell membrane, perhaps the borders of our psyches—our thoughts and feelings—are more porous than we imagine. What we need to do is make sense of the exchange of ethically relevant materials that penetrate the dynamic membrane of our practical, ethical, and emotion-driven lives.     On the ethical and epistemological front, this leads us to the problem of other minds. Empathy and compassion—not just pristinely principled reason—can motivate us to do what we feel is right. Sometimes the right thing to do is act on behalf of another without expecting (or desiring) anything in return. But how do I come to feel the gravity of your situation, how does your suffering or joy directly motivate my action, rather than remain an indirectly inferred data-point in a causal chain? Can I really know that your suffering motivates me to act strictly on your behalf? I do not believe that inference gets us there, partly because of its dearth of emotive force, and partly because I endorse the view that a third-person description of consciousness does not fully capture qualia and the “what-it’s-likeness” of a first-
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person experience. In other words, the conscious feeling of grief or suffering is not just another object in the world, like a lap-top, stone, or a tree.  I offer one basic argument to defend this latter point. Any good revision must make sense of my experience. I still see the sun setting daily, but I do not believe it actually sinks below the horizon. I know that the appearance is caused by the rotation of the earth (among other things). Still, the revision that allows me to dispense with my thought also provides an answer to why I experience things that way. The self-reflexivity thesis, endorsed by both Abhinavagupta and Dharmakīrti—a thesis that I endorse—is not explained by an objectified account of the first-person experience. You might provide an excellent account of the physical mechanisms that underlie immersion in an experience, but you can only do so by ignoring the first-person experience altogether. The revision has not explained my experience, but instead, it has explained it away. Similarly, as Abhinavagupta points out, self-reflexive awareness is not an object that I can perceive. Even when I introspect, this 
occurs against a background of awareness already presupposed by the “inward 
gaze.”   Something like this last point—the inherently reflexive and first-personal view of consciousness—underwrites various forms of idealism. Dharmakīrti, and other Vijñānavāda Buddhists, provide ample reasons for endorsing idealism. While 
the Pratybhijñā philosophy of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also endorses 
idealism, it parts with Dharmakīrti in positing both a real self, and metaphysical monism. These views collectively amount to solipsism, which on the surface seems to perniciously undermine the coherence of other-centric and altruistic 
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considerations. However, Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of otherness and other minds nicely parallels the mereological holism I have developed above. This is where I believe the metaphysical view has some distinct advantages in being able to better explain our sense that we share feelings, and these sometimes motivate selfless action. I will conclude by more thoroughly explaining how Abhinavagupta helps get us there, and what this might mean for altruistic action.  
4.8.2 “Guessing” the Existence of Other Minds: A Śaivite Account of Reaching 
Common Ground 
 In his Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vimarśini (IPV), Abhinavagupta comments upon Utpaladeva’s claim that “through action, knowledge of others is guessed (ūhyate).” Two things are puzzling in this claim. First, a superficial read of the claim might identify it as a form of behaviorism. I see Chakrabarti act in the right ways, and I assume that he is conscious just like me. Second, it seems that by “guessing” the agency and sentience of Chakrabarti (by observing his behavior), I’m only inferring that he has a mind. However, Abhinavagupta argues that Utpala uses the 
concept of “guessing” to avoid the claim that we infer the existence of other minds.44 At stake in the distinction between “guessing” and empirically inferring is the belief that consciousness cannot be objectified, and thus, empirically inferred. Your feeling                                                       44 Cited from Ratié, Otherness, 355. The IPV verse:   | ūhyata ity anena jñānasya prameyatvaṃ na nirvahatīti darśayati anyathā hy 
anumīyata iti brūyāt ||  
By “is guessed” (ūhyate), [Utpala] indicates that knowledge cannot bear to be an object (prameya), for otherwise he would have said [instead]: “is inferred” (anumīyata). IPV, volume I, 49.   
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is not an object that operates as a data-point in a causal chain motivating my action. Like the Buddhist idealists, the Advaita-Śaivite would not stand for explaining away the reflexive first-person experience through an objectifying third-person account. Your feeling is inherently first-personal and reflexive, something the description of a data-point or causal force does not directly explain.     But imagine if we adopted the inference model. Your suffering enters into the causal story of my decision to help you. But the only first-person presence I experience appears from a single vantage-point. I may act as if there were other minds with vantage-points, but “this immediate and singular presence” is all that I directly encounter. I do not need to commit to any metaphysical view of self here. On a purely empirical basis, I observe that the “I” is simply the vantage-point from which things are present in a first-person way.45 Other first-person experiences are only inferred, and remain within the fictionalist-domain of “as if” semantics. Acting for the sake of the common good, or solely for the sake of your well-being, would amount to me acting out of the presence of my first-person considerations. Granted, the target of my action—that is, a sentient-sapient creature for which things can matter—is objectified as a special sort of perceptual object, but as an object 
nevertheless. Any sense of “I-ness” that would connect my action to an agent, and not a passive or inert object, would be derivative of the only “I” that I experience—
myself (the one for whom things are present).46 This does not rule out the possibility of acting on considerations of the greater good, but it comes with the caveat that all                                                       45 Caspar Hare develops this view in On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. 
He calls this “Egocentric Presentism.”  46 Ibid., see chapter 1. 
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of my considerations are derivative of egocentric concerns. These are not necessarily selfish concerns, but they are always egocentrically present concerns. In other words, I am unable to be directly motivated by your suffering, or immediately experience you as a self-aware person for whom I can altruistically act. We lose the possibility of a directly other-centric action, because we lose the possibility of directly encountering the other.   Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva attack the inference hypothesis, because it objectifies consciousness. And yet, their monistic-idealism amounts to solipsism, and so the same sort of problem with respect to other-centricity also seems to emerge. However, Abhinavagupta develops Utpaladeva’s point further, and offers what I believe is a solution to the problem that is very much aligned with the account of mereological holism I developed earlier. To develop Abhinavagupta’s argument further, we need to look at some important premises driving his account. 
Key Premises [Premise 1]: Consciousness, understood as reflexive awareness, is a form of 
knowing, in the sense that perceptions include “self-grasping” (svasaṃvedana) 47 
and “internal grasping” (saṃrambha).  
                                                      47 By this account, it seems, any expression of sentience would be, simultaneously, 
sapient. So if I were willing to admit that my beloved dog is sentient—which I am willing to admit—then my dog would be included in the class of things that have knowledge. More problematic, however, is the idea that consciousness comes with 
“self-grasping.” The view that a self is only formed in language, and that any robust 
notion of “I-ness” requires complex language-use and a developed self-narrative would not permit bare consciousness, say of a toad or a horsefly, into the class of things that have a self. But this problematic notion is also compelling: conscious 
things may very well be “selves” at various orders of complexity. This issue goes well beyond what I can cover here.  
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o By “self-grasping” I am referring to the view that when P is cognized, the cognizing of P is also simultaneously cognized.  
o “Internal grasping” refers to my capacity to recognize that what is inert in my perception, say, this white sheet of paper, is indelibly manifested in a first-person experience; this is my conscious state cognizing a white sheet of paper. In this way, perception is always active and (at least in a broad sense) knowledge-producing (it manifests the knowledge of its own awareness).  [Premise 2]:  Knowledge, understood as an inherent facet of consciousness, does 
not “shine as an object” (na…jñānam idantayā bhāti).48 In other words, we do not experience the consciousness of other minds as a mere object, just as we do not experience our own minds as empirical objects replete with spatially locatable properties. 
o For Abhinavagupta, consciousness is self-manifested in the sense that it cannot be proved, but only presupposed in any proof. For it to be the sort of thing that we experience, say, introspectively as an object, would be unthinkable, because experiencing my consciousness already presupposes the very awareness I may aim to objectify. Viewing the self as background reflexive-awareness, explains why Hume and the Buddha could not find the empirical object they were introspectively seeking: self-awareness is empirically transparent.  
o The immediate grasping of my own conscious state is called “vimarśa,” and 
unlike Dharmakīrti, Abhinavagupta does not see the inherently conceptual                                                       48 See Ratié, Otherness, 356, where she quotes IPV. 
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nature of perception as error-producing, or something that covers over an initially non-conceptual and ephemeral property-trope. Instead, self-awareness is a self-standing background constraint.   These premises underwrite Abhinavagupta’s solution to the problem of other 
minds. The “guess” of which Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva speak, amounts to a kind of recognition rather than a rational inference. Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva would agree that we distinguish the conscious from the inert by observing agency, 
but this is not an ordinary empirical claim. In Dharmakīrti’s system, a kārya-hetu inference connects two independent events by locating one as part of the causal story of the other. But in his auto-commentary on the IPV, Abhinavagupta argues 
that our “guess” of other minds is an inference of the svabhāva-hetu variety. When I observe a closed-plane figure consisting of three and only three sides, I am grounded in calling this a triangle. I soon come to recognize that I am warranted in making the claim that the sum of two right angles is equivalent to the sum of the angles in a triangle by appealing only to the meaning of the terms involved. I was not initially in a position to make this claim, because I was initially confused about the nature of triangles and right angles. In this way, inferring that when I see the triangle, I also see the sum of two right angles does not provide me with independent, empirical knowledge. Similarly, when I see consciousness incarnated, say, in the speech-act of a person, I am not making an empirical inference between two independent events, one of which stands as the cause of the other (as in 
Dharmakīrti’s argument). Instead, I recognize that the very essence of consciousness includes action. In this sense, I am “guessing” (but not inferring) the existence of 
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other minds, because I am coming to recognize that what allows me to call this an 
“action” (and not just a mere event) grounds my calling this an incarnation of consciousness.   But how does Abhinavagupta ground such a claim? The key lies in Premise 1. Consciousness is viewed as inherently knowledge-producing in the sense that it 
discloses itself in the very act of cognizing. Now, in Dharmakīrti’s example of the speech-act/mental-state pervasion (vyāpta), we can distinguish a mental state from the action it underwrites. However, for Abhinavagupta, since perception is itself already an action (in the sense that it grasps an external object while simultaneously grasping itself), incarnated action is only the final stage of consciousness itself. The power of “internal action” (āntarī kriyāṡaktiḥ) is not something I infer. It is something immediately experienced, because to hypothetically observe consciousness grasping itself and grasping an object (say, as a third cognition observing the relation between the latter two) would, again, presuppose the very act of grasping I am attempting to observe. Consciousness does not see itself grasping itself as it might see a cup of tea on the desk. In the very act of seeing the tea, consciousness recognizes its own seeing. This may partly explain why I am shocked that what I was looking for was right in front of my eyes the whole time (literally), and yet, it is not as though upon learning this I see a new object filling space where, before, I was gazing at a mere void, or, an absence. Instead, I realize that in distraction (moha), I was indeed gazing at an object without explicitly recognizing the nature of the object standing before me. Consciousness was at work taking in its experience even in my distracted state.  
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 The idea here is that just as I recognize that the wave in the ocean is a partial state (aṃśa) of the ocean itself, I recognize that the action of the person in front of me is a manifested state of consciousness.49 This view is attractive, because it collapses the distinction between logical behaviorism and irreducible first-person awareness—we move past the problem Wittgenstein was getting at with his “beetle 
in a box.” We do not reduce the inherent first-person experience of consciousness to a mere set of describable actions and subjunctives. Nor do we puzzle over how to connect first-person thoughts with external behavior. In some sense, we actually perceive consciousness incarnated through the carrying out of what (logically, not temporally) begins as an internal, but sentient action manifesting in bodily movement.   When we couple this view with mereological holism, we provide ourselves with just the tools we need to share motivating emotional states. In one state of the whole, I am numerically distinct from you, and can experience the independent validity of your needs (and my own). However, I may also come to recognize (in the sense that I re-cognize a background unity that was always there to begin with) the inherently motivating state of suffering itself. Suffering is “owned,” because it belongs to a suffering-self. But the suffering is only delimited by the incarnated manifestation of the whole under the aspect of individuation. This is the sense in                                                       49 Ratié, Otherness, 359: “And just as, when we perceive a wave, we are not perceiving an entity that would be different from the river and that the river would produce while remaining ontologically distinct from it, but a mere aspect (aṃśa) of 
the river itself…in the same way, to perceive the other’s action is not to perceive an entity different from him or her, and merely related to him or her by a causality relation, for the relation between a subject and his action is not a relation of causality but a relation of identity—only the latter is a partial aspect of the former, 
his objective aspect.” 
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which Abhinavagupta would argue that my awareness of you is recognition of my own subjectivity,50 but not of the empirically grounded sort of ego-solipsism that 
“Egocentric Presentism” describes.51 I am not alone as a solitary ego. When we communicate with each other, and I recognize your suffering as the sort of thing that 
would prompt you to seek help, our subjectivity in some sense “fuses.”52 The degree to which I take your suffering seriously, and the degree to which it motivates me as it does you, is the degree to which it is possible for me to see past our distinctly self-interested trajectories, and act on behalf of the larger suffering I see before me. To see your suffering at this level is to see past the narrative and participant identity that shapes my social self, and recognize a will to act that responds to suffering as such. My delimited-ego is no longer the only ground of my action. Suffering itself moves me to act in the recognition that suffering requires action. Of course, at the applied level, the context will determine what sort of action suffering requires (for 
example, if we’re talking about helpful suffering, or suffering that warrants an act of omission). But I can respond to something beyond the constellation of 
“egocentrically present” empirical perceptions, because the motivation of my action does not need to be reduced to something my ego-self “owns.”   In this sense, I am merely pointing a way toward a metaphysical self. We may argue that unity across sensory modalities—my capacity to touch now what I saw then—requires a synthesizing self that allows me to experience the sensory                                                       50 Ratié, Otherness, 363: “To be aware of others is to recognize in them my own 
subjectivity.” 51 See fn. 42.  52 Ibid, 364: “For communication, according to [Abhinava and Utpala], is nothing but a partial fusion of the different limited subjects. Such a fusion is possible because the absolute consciousness is, in its essence, a free agency.” 
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wholeness of objects. We may argue that to make sense of a memory being more 
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